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THE MORAL POLITICS OF SOCIAL
CONTROL: POLITICAL CULTURE AND
ORDINARY CRIME IN CUBA
Deborah M. Weissman & Marsha Weissman*
[Y]our ideals are too high . . . . An idea that is so high that it is beyond
reach of the real is not very useful . . . . What you need here among the
Cubans is a desire to make money, to found great enterprises, and to
carry on the prosperity of this beautiful island, and the young Cubans
ought, most of them, to begin in business . . . . The right of property
and the motive for accumulation, next to the right of liberty, is the basis
of all modern, successful civilization, and until you have a community
of political influence and control which is affected by the conserving
influences of property and property ownership, successful popular government is impossible.1
[T]he moral factors, the factors of conscience, the cultural factors are
irreplaceable under socialism. We should not think, even for a minute,
that we are going to solve with money those problems that only the
conscience can resolve. What we should do is use material incentives
intelligently and combine them with moral stimuli, use them as reinforcers. We should not believe for an instant that now we can manage
today’s man, the socialist man, by virtue of material incentives exclusively, because material incentives do not have the attraction here that
they have under capitalism where everything depends—life and
death—upon the money in one’s pocket.2
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Cuba to whom we owe an enormous debt for providing us with her papers, research materials, and introducing us to scholars, jurists, and attorneys from all over Cuba. Gladys
Marel García and Fidel Requeijo also provided invaluable and continuing support during
our research in Havana and Yaguajay. The authors gratefully acknowledge Maxine Eichner, Barbara Fedders, and Louis Pérez, Jr. for their support and insightful observations
and suggestions, as well as the participants of the Duke-UNC summer faculty workshop.
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1. William Howard Taft, Provisional Governor of Cuba, Address at the Opening
Exercises of the National University of Habana (Oct. 1, 1906).
2. Fidel Castro, Cuban Prime Minister, Address at the Closing Ceremony of the 13th
Congress of the Central Organization of Cuban Workers (Nov. 16, 1973).
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INTRODUCTION
The Cuban revolution has been described as “the longest running social experiment” in history—one not well-received in the United States.3
The U.S. government responded to the revolution first with suspicion and
then with hostility. Initially, the United States was most concerned by the
close geographical proximity of a Soviet Union-allied socialist government, as well as the possibility of Cuban influence in Latin America. In
the post-Cold War years, journalists and pundits focused their commentary on Cuba’s lack of democratic political institutions, human rights violations, and a pathological obsession with the Castro brothers.4 Even
though the current administration has acknowledged the failure of U.S.
policy with respect to Cuba, no substantive changes have been announced.5 As a result, the narrative of Cuba in the United States continues to dwell almost exclusively on political repression and economic
failure.6
The Cuban revolution, however, is a complex process—one that defies
facile explanations. Subscribing to the perspective offered by social
scientists who urge “a more nuanced view” of Cuba,7 we undertake an
examination of a specific facet of the Cuban revolution in this Article:
the Cuban approach to ordinary crime. While other scholars have addressed Cuba’s criminal justice system by focusing on formal legal substance, procedural matters, and socialist legality, this Article provides an
alternative opportunity to examine commonly held views about socialist
governance.8 Perhaps more importantly, it provides insights into the

3. The Cuba Studies Trust, International Institute for the Study of Cuba,
http://www.cubastudiestrust.org/plan.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
4. See Saul Landau, U.S. Media Images of Postrevolutionary Cuba: Shaped by Government Policy and Commercial Grammar, LATIN AM. PERSP., July 2006, at 118.
5. On April 13, 2009, the White House announced the easing of some travel and
remittance restrictions for Cuban-American families. Press Release, The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People (Apr. 13,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Reachingout-to-the-Cuban-people/; see also Mark Landler, Clinton Impresses Foreign Audiences
by Saying U.S. Policies Have Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at A4.
6. Landau, supra note 4, at 122 (critiquing reports that “pose outdated and ethnocentric questions” related to Cuba’s failure to adopt U.S. standards); see also Associated
Press, Cuba: Dispute on Castro’s Intent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A13 (noting current U.S. demands that Cuba address human rights and political prisoners).
7. Alexander I. Gray & Antoni Kapcia, Introduction: Responding to Crisis at the
Grass Roots, in THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY 1, 8 (Alexander I.
Gray & Antoni Kapcia eds., 2008).
8. See Gerard J. Clark, The Legal Profession in Cuba, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 413, 436; Erik Luna, Cuban Criminal Justice and the Ideal of Good Governance, 14
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ways in which political culture and social controls interact to produce a
coherent and generally successful policy response to crime. In fact, Cuban methods have resulted in noteworthy developments within a socialist
system that has to do as much with traditions of political culture as it
does with Marxist ideology. That Cuba has succeeded in reducing reliance on formal penal sanctions and lowered crime rates invites comparison with the United States, where strategies of community controls as an
alternative to incarceration have met with less success.9
This Article focuses on social controls designed to regulate two types
of criminal behavior related to family structures, households, and neighborhoods: domestic violence between intimate partners and juvenile delinquency.10 These types of complex social deviancies may be categorized as “ordinary crime,” as distinguished from “political crime” or
crimes of a political nature.11 These are contentious terms, of course, the
boundaries of which are often difficult to establish within the realm of
nation states and in international legal fora.12 That ordinary crimes may
be considered political, and political crimes may be considered ordinary,
suggests that these terms are often malleable and lend themselves to easy
manipulation.13 This is as true in Cuba as it is in the United States and
elsewhere.14 Furthermore, many feminist scholars have focused on the
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 529, 531, 554 (2004); Erik Luna, A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 277, 302–03 (2003/2004).
9. Marguerite Rose Jiménez, The Political Economy of Leisure, in A
CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION 146, 147 (Philip Brenner
et al. eds., 2008) (noting low crime rates based on a study of the tourism industry). See
generally Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration
in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235 (2009).
10. The authors use the term “domestic violence”—a less than ideal term—as opposed to “gender violence” because of this Article’s focus on violence between intimate
partners within the family, and to distinguish such violence from violence against women
outside of the home or family.
11. Rachel Monaghan & Suzanne McLaughlin, Informal Justice in the City, 10 SPACE
& POLITY 171, 172 (2006) (noting, for example, the different categories used by paramilitaries in Northern Ireland for purposes of punishment).
12. Marco Roscini, Great Expectations: The Implementation of the Rome Statute in
Italy, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 493, 510 n.55 (2007) (defining political crimes as including
ordinary crimes effected for political reasons); Aimée J. Buckland, Comment, Offending
Officials: Former Government Actors and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition,
94 CAL. L. REV. 423, 441 (2006) (defining “a relative political offense” as “a common
crime pursued with a political purpose”).
13. Matthew Hannah, Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a
Geographical Imagination of Power/Knowledge, 96 ANN. ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS
622, 626 (2006).
14. José E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38
TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 437 (2003) (noting U.S. efforts to convince other states to treat cer-
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political nature of crimes of domestic violence while scholars of racism
have called attention to the political dimensions of youth and crime in the
criminal justice system.
With these caveats in mind, this Article examines the participatory
networks through which Cubans exercise and experience social control
over ordinary crime.15 Part I examines notions of public morality, the
historical antecedents of Cuban political culture, and the relevance of
these topics to ordinary crime control—all from a sociolegal perspective—in order to argue that values associated with Cuban liberation
processes in the nineteenth century affected the current formation of
commonly-shared ideals and the development of social consensus. These
nineteenth century values incorporated an ethic based on the proposition
of the perfectability of human beings through participation in organizations and civic associations, which provided the rationale for convocation: to make common cause, to share common purpose, and to develop
consciousness of solidarity.
Part II reviews Cuban theories of social control, detailing how mass
organizations and civil society associations act to influence a culture of
citizen responsibility in the realm of crime prevention and how these entities facilitate the exercise of that responsibility. This discussion will
demonstrate how organizational processes promote community solidarity
and, thus, provide the moral basis for neighborhood involvement in and
mitigation of the day-to-day conditions that often contribute to disaffection and deviance.16
Next, Part III serves as a case study that demonstrates how a culture of
civic responsibility shapes citizens’ identifications of, and responses to
domestic violence and juvenile delinquency. The effort to achieve gender
equality serves as the framework in which Cubans address the problems
of violence against women, efforts that cannot be separated from crime
control strategies. Similarly, the exalted social status of youth in Cuban
culture shapes the approach to juvenile crime. This Part examines both
informal and formal legal responses to domestic violence and juvenile
delinquency, both of which are shaped by values that eschew criminal
sanctions as a useful response.
tain terrorist acts as ordinary crimes that could be handled in their courts as well as ours);
Hannah, supra note 13.
15. Our research, as well as that of others who have examined the Cuban criminal
justice system, confirms the validity of a working differentiation between ordinary crimes
(common crimes that include such offenses as murder, robbery, assault, theft, and those
studied here) and political crime (crimes that are perceived to be threats to national security). See sources cited supra note 8.
16. See infra Part II(B)(2).
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Finally, in order to emphasize the significance of political culture as a
determinant of social controls, Part IV draws comparisons between crime
control measures in Cuba and the United States. While imposition of
state sanctions has been the dominant approach to crime in the United
States, this discussion will focus on Alternatives to Incarceration
(“ATI”)—U.S. community-based initiatives that incorporate many premises and practices similar to Cuban participatory mechanisms of crime
control. This is to illustrate that the success of such programs hinges on
political culture. In the United States, ATI programs function within the
shadow of a carceral state marked by decades of declining social capital.
We argue that this backdrop explains why Cuba can rely on community
norms to control crime more effectively than the United States.
The fieldwork for this Article was completed over a period of five
years (from 2002 to 2007), during which one or both of the authors traveled to Cuba.17 We met with academics, members of the Ministry of
Justice, diplomats, members of prevention commissions, government and
private lawyers (including prosecutors and defense attorneys), physicians, nurses, social workers, high school students, members of the Cuban Federation for Women, and members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. We attended meetings and assemblies, visited
health clinics and schools, and observed daily life in Havana as well as
other parts of Cuba.
I. THE DETERMINANTS OF CUBAN SOCIAL CONTROL
The determinants of social control in Cuba have their origins in early
nineteenth century philosophies, which were carried forward and deepened with urgency from Cuba’s successive wars for independence from
Spain to the revolution of 1959. This Part describes this historical trajectory and the resulting development of a particular political culture
steeped in notions of shared social duty and moral obligations and realized through the imperative of collective participation. Civic virtue is
expressed through collective endeavors, including efforts toward improving the wellbeing of those whose behavior stands outside norms of respectability. It is this feature of Cuban political culture that informs and
influences participatory mechanisms deployed in crime control.

17. Because of the adverse impact of U.S.-Cuban intergovernmental relations on
sociolegal research, we identify, for the most part, the profession, position, or discipline
of the persons with whom we met, and the date when and location where we met them.
For more on the impact of the U.S.-Cuban relations on scholarly research, see Jorge I.
Domínguez, Revolution and Its Aftermath in Cuba, 43 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 225, 226,
238–39 (2008).
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A. Moralism as Political Culture
Scholars have given justifiable attention to the antecedents of the Cuban revolution as a culmination of a historical process with roots in the
nineteenth century. Writing about the larger meaning of the Cuban revolutionary tradition, historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr. observed that “the power
of the past [gives] purpose to the present.”18 This statement serves as a
guide to understanding much about contemporary Cuba. The experiences
of the wars for independence from Spain in the nineteenth century and
the repeated mobilizations against the United States in the twentieth century broadly inform the project of revolution after 1959.
Among the pre-revolutionary ideals that influenced the revolution was
the belief in an integrated social order based on virtue, personal transformation, and sacrifice for nation (patria).19 During the nineteenth century, a particular ethos of moralism developed and served as the cultural
matrix from which Cuban identity was formed.20 Philosopher Félix Varela—whose early nineteenth century writings have been described as the
“bible of Cuban identity”—preached an “emancipatory moralism” and
insisted that morality in Cuba would be measured by willingness to be
“useful to the fatherland.”21 Sixty years later, José Martí addressed the
moral meanings of national independence, calling for a fundamental ethical change and transformation of Cuban political culture. “It is to the
substance of these matters that we are going, rather than to the forms,”
said Marti. “It is a case of changing a nation’s soul, [its] entire way of
thinking and acting, and not just [its] external clothes.”22 Martí’s invocation of a “moral republic” emanated from what has been described as a
“missionary impulse” of historic dimensions that emphasized social jus18. LOUIS A. PÉREZ JR., THE WAR OF 1898, at 126 (1998); see also David Rieff, Cuba
Refrozen, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 1996, at 62, 62 (noting that Cuba’s “political culture
is steeped in the legends of resistance and self-immolation of the nineteenth-century
struggle for independence”).
19. JAMES J. PANCRAZIO, THE LOGIC OF FETISHISM: ALEJO CARPENTIER AND THE
CUBAN TRADITION 158 (2004); Antoni Kapcia, One Hundred Years of Solitude: 1898 and
1998 in the Cuban Search for National Identity, in SPAIN’S 1898 CRISIS:
REGENERATIONISM, MODERNISM, POST-COLONIALISM 229, 236 (Joseph Harrison & Alan
Hoyle eds., 2000); Nelson P. Valdés, Cuban Political Culture: Between Betrayal and
Death, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION 207, 214 (Sandor Halebsky
& John M. Kirk eds., 1992) (citing FÉLIX VARELA, 1 LECCIONES DE FILOSOFÍA).
20. See sources cited id.
21. See sources cited supra note 19.
22. 5 JOSÉ MARTÍ, 5 OBRAS COMPLETAS [COMPLETE WORKS] 368–69 (1963), quotation translated in Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk, Introduction, in CUBA: TWENTYFIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION, 1959 TO 1984 at 3, 7–8 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk
eds., 1985).
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tice and redemption for the benefit of all Cubans.23 The ideal of a moral
republic, based on an ethic of honor, dignity, and decorum, seized hold
of the Cuban imagination. This ideal endured as a sentiment to which
subsequent generations subscribed, and it shaped the discursive framework in which Cuban political culture developed.24
With the triumph of the revolution, Cubans moved purposefully to establish a society in accordance with nineteenth century ideals of selfsacrifice, collective duty, and civic participation. Indeed, Cuban scholars
have described the revolution as the “resurrection of political and moral
charisma” and an “ethical regeneration” derived from a “pre-existing
moralistic movement that denounced and fought against selfish interests.”25 Such idealism is the lens through which historic cultural concepts
of social duty and moral responsibility have provided the normative context of political change.
All political systems are shaped, to varying degrees, by historicallydetermined ethical paradigms. In the United States, early foundational
concerns focused on conceptions of republicanism and the proposition of
civic virtue as individual initiative over State intervention. Patriotism is
celebrated as freedom of the individual. In contrast, the Cuban revolution
drew upon a tradition of civic virtue as a collective effort to achieve collective redemption in which the State intervened as a matter of moral
duty to guarantee social justice.26 The revolution’s commitment to fulfilling basic needs, for example, drew explicitly upon notions of moralism
as inspiration for the radical transformation of society.27 Fidel Castro
23. See Archibald R.M. Ritter, The Transferability of Socioeconomic Development
Models of Revolutionary Cuba, 7 CUBAN STUDIES/ESTUDIOS CUBANOS 183, 183 (1977);
LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR., CUBA BETWEEN EMPIRES: 1878–1902, at 106–07 (1983).
24. Valdés, supra note 19, at 214.
25. Nelson P. Valdés, The Revolutionary and Political Content of Fidel Castro’s
Charismatic Authority, in A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION 27, 31 (Philip Brenner et al. eds., 2008).
26. Rafael Hernández & Haroldo Dilla, Political Culture and Popular Participation
in Cuba, LATIN AM. PERSP., Spring 1992, at 38, 42–43 (Jennifer Dugan Abbassi & Jean
Díaz trans.1991) (equality as Cuba’s ideological culture).
27. Fidel Castro, Cuba Prime Minister, Address before the General Assembly of the
People of Cuba (Sept. 2, 1960), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/1960/
[hereinafter Castro General Assembly Speech] (relying on a vigorously moral people to
achieve the goals of the revolution as expressed in the Havana Declaration); Fidel Castro,
Cuba Prime Minister, Castro Speaks on Literacy Campaign (Aug. 17, 1961) (equating
literacy campaigns with moral obligations), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/
castro/db/1961/19610817.html [hereinafter Castro Literacy Campaign Speech]; Fidel
Castro, Cuba Prime Minister, Castro’s Aviation Day Speech (Apr. 18, 1963) (linking
morality with patriotism), available at http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/
1963/ [hereinafter Castro Aviation Day Speech]; see also Miguel Martinez-Saenz, Che
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made frequent references to the virtues of personal sacrifice for the benefit of the collective good in order to encourage Cubans to undertake volunteer work, routinely offering reminders that personal worth is derived
from service, not self-interest.28 His exhortations resonated precisely because they drew upon a legacy derived from the nineteenth-century liberation project. Appeals not only to Marxism but to morality with antecedents in the nineteenth century must be understood as motivating the
shaping of contemporary Cuba, and, as demonstrated below, appeals to
morality permeate Cuban approaches to ordinary crime.29
B. Moralism Actualized: Participation as Moral Social Conduct
Cuban traditions of moralism are more than a theoretical construct;
moralism must function to achieve a purpose. Values are practiced as
part of daily life in the form of citizen participation and social organization. Participatory mechanisms are the means by which Cubans exercise
their “place-bound source of self-identification” (that is, consciousness
of being Cuban, or, conciencia) and transact the moral paradigm to advance the ideals of the revolution.30 Programs to build housing, schools,
and medical facilities, improve transportation, and develop agriculture
require volunteers working in mass organizations.31
That most Cubans have been involved in some sort of campaign to implement Cuban-style socioeconomic development suggests that means
have served as ends, and that the realization of the goals of any particular
campaign acted to expand citizen participation in the revolution.32 InGuevara’s New Man: Embodying a Communitarian Attitude, LATIN AM. PERSP., Nov
2004, at 15, 21.
28. Valdés, supra note 25; Castro General Assembly Speech, supra note 27; Castro
Literacy Campaign Speech, supra note 27; Castro Aviation Day Speech, supra note 27.
29. Valdés, supra note 19, at 213.
30. LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION 340 (2d ed.
1995) [hereinafter PÉREZ, JR., CUBA]; Louis A. Pérez Jr., Thinking Back on Cuba’s Future: The Logic of Patria, NACLA REP. ON THE AM., Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 12, 13 (2009).
The importance of participatory mechanisms by which Cuba’s social problems are encountered is noted extensively in the literature. See CAROLLEE BENGELSDORF, THE
PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY IN CUBA: BETWEEN VISION AND REALITY 8 (1994); RICHARD R.
FAGEN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN CUBA 2 (1969); Arthur MacEwan, Why is Cuba Different?, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION, 1959 TO
1984, at 420, 420–21 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1985).
31. Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk, Introduction, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
OF REVOLUTION, 1959 TO 1984 at 3, 7–8 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1985);
Hernández & Dilla, supra note 26, at 42.
32. BENGELSDORF, supra note 30, at 86; see also On Celebrating the Cuban Revolution, LAT. AMER. PERSP., Jan 2009, at 5, 11 (2009) (noting the high rate of Cuban participation in mass organizations).
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deed, some scholars have insisted that the larger significance of the Cuban revolution has been its ability to continually mobilize the populace
through mass organizations.33 As one Cuban political scientist has written, citizen collaboration functions as the Cuban form of democracy, that
is, “a system on which power is constructed and legitimated by citizen
representation and participation.”34 Popular participation has been “both
motive and motor” of the revolutionary effort, as well as the measure of
historic traditions of morality and revolutionary citizenship.35
Cuban society therefore can be best understood as the interdependent
relationship between consciousness and cultural practices manifested as
popular participation. Participatory mechanisms serve as the means by
which individuals often gain access to resources and in turn become invested in relationships of interdependencies and mutual obligations.36
These mechanisms serve as the networks where repeated cooperative
interactions enhance personal connections and neighborliness and
through which the fabric of social trust is woven. With respect to the focus of this Article, these participatory structures serve as the foundations
of social control, mediating between ecological conditions, community
disorder, and crime.37
II. THE MACHINERY OF SOCIAL CONTROL
This Part examines the specific ways Cuban participatory structures affect social controls. It begins with an overview of approaches to social
controls—these approaches being the comprehensive strategies used to
deter behaviors deemed pernicious to stability and order.38 Social con-

33. BENGELSDORF, supra note 30, at 85; FAGEN, supra note 30, at 1–2; see also infra
Part II(B)(1).
34. Rafael Hernández, On Cuban Democracy: Cuba and the Democratic Culture, in
A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION 74, 76 (Philip Brenner
et al. eds., 2008).
35. FAGEN, supra note 30, at 7.
36. Ulla V. Bondeson, Levels of Punitiveness in Scandinavia: Description and Explanations, in THE NEW PUNITIVENESS: TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES 189, 195 (John
Pratt et al. eds., 2005) (discussing high levels of political participation in Scandinavian
countries).
37. Todd R. Clear & Dina R. Rose, Individual Sentencing Practices and Aggregate
Social Problems, in CRIME CONTROL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE DELICATE BALANCE 27,
39 (Darnell F. Hawkins et al. eds., 2003).
38. STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 1 (1985); see also John R. Sutton,
Rethinking Social Control, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 943 (1996) (reviewing THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio
eds., 1991)) (“In the contemporary sociolegal literature, few concepts are invoked more
frequently, and with less clarity of meaning and purpose, than that of social control.”).
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trols include formal and informal strategies that emerge from local communities, government, or the market.39 As a means of governance, they
possess “the capacity of a social unit to regulate itself according to desired principles—to realize collective, as opposed to forced, goals.”40
Cuban participatory organizations, and, particularly, their micro-level
practices, create the means for social control and influence the processes
for responding to crime.41 Participation in Cuban mass and local organizations both fosters an awareness of the conditions that often cause crime
and builds community relationships essential to social control mechanisms.42
A. Social Controls and Ordinary Crime in Cuba
The control of crime is a basic function of a well-ordered society. Although there are a number of theories that seek to explain criminal behavior, two concepts stand as organizing principles. The first approach—
often referred to as Individual or Rational Choice Theory—proposes that
deviant behavior is a function of individual choice.43 This perspective
suggests criminals make rational choices among alternative courses of
action (i.e., “crime is a decision not a disease”).44 The second approach
posits that deviant behavior is socially structured and that poor people
39. Joachim J. Savelsberg, Cultures of Control in Contemporary Society, 27 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 685, 686, 708 (2002) (reviewing DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001)) (noting a diversity of approaches to social controls).
40. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of
Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603,
610 (1999) (citing Morris Janowitz, Sociological Theory and Social Control, 81 AM. J.
SOC. 82, 87 (1975)); see also John Hasnas, The Depoliticization of Law, 9 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. 529, 530 (2008) (noting that laws may be coercive but not dominate).
41. See Manuel A. Gómez, All in the Family: The Influence of Social Networks on
Dispute Processing (A Case Study of a Developing Economy), 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
291, 302–04 (describing how social conditions may influence the culture of dispute
processes).
42. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM . J.
SOC. S. 95, 102–04 (1988) (describing social capital as interpersonal relationships and
institutional linkages through which obligations and expectations are facilitated, norms
and sanctions developed, and where people make use of each other’s skills and knowledge).
43. See generally Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Enduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 467 (1993).
44. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 198 (2001); John Hagan, Introduction: Crime in Social and
Legal Context, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 255, 255 (1993) (the ethos of individualism focuses
on crime as a function of the individual).
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and racial minorities are more likely to be identified as criminals because
of the state of powerlessness and the socioeconomic disadvantages they
suffer.45 Under this approach, crime is the direct and indirect result of
social conditions, including historical circumstances, political conditions,
and economic forces.46
Rational Choice Theory is associated with a course of action less tolerant of crime and more punitive toward acts defined as criminal. In this
theory, the purpose of social controls is to isolate and sanction those individuals who will not and/or cannot control their own conduct, and to
subject such individuals to strict controls.47 Rational Choice Theory also
minimizes responsibility or obligation on the part of society in general
for the actions of criminals.48
In contrast, the social structure theory adopts the social control response that David Garland has called a “broader solidarity project.”49
This theory focuses on the macro political conditions and economic concerns, and the development of a social agenda that focuses on poverty
prevention, economic assistance, and distribution of services.50 The circumstances of communities in which offenders reside are central points
of consideration and interest.51
The Cuban approach to social control of crime follows the structural
approach. It is based on the premise that ordinary crime is the result of
particular social conditions and is therefore responsive to solutions mediated through mass and local organizations.52 Cuban jurists approach
ordinary crime—especially domestic violence and juvenile delinquency—in the context of political, social, and economic conditions, and they
draw on structural-based theoretical foundations for guidance.53 They
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. GARLAND, supra note 44, at 198.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 199.
50. Id.; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and
Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 173 (2008).
51. Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759 (2005) (describing this approach as a
function of the social welfare system that mitigates unemployment and poverty).
52. Of course, Cuba’s consideration of the social causes of crime is not unique. See
GARLAND, supra note 44, at 188 (describing an approach used for much of the 20th century in the United States and Great Britain).
53. See Caridad Navarrete Calderón, Early Preventing Work in Groups of Prevention
of the Popular Councils 3 (2002) (noting a consensus about the inefficiencies of formal
penal system controls) (on file with author); Euclides Catá Guilarte, Cuban Social Policy
and Disadvantaged Social Groups, in SOCIAL WORK IN CUBA AND SWEDEN 93, 101
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believe the proper response to these structural problems is to improve the
human condition (“lucha por la formación de un hombre mejor”)
through distribution of services by way of egalitarian initiatives.54 At the
same time, criminologists draw on theories of collectively enacted social
agency whereby individual participation is central to achieving the
shared public goal of crime prevention.
Individuals who transgress well-settled norms are often provided a
range of services as a front-line response.55 Criminologists proceed from
the premise that experts, in collaboration with the community, are dutybound to promote human values within each individual, including those
with criminal predilections.56 Criminals are recognized as possessing
both strengths and weaknesses—they might threaten the social order, but
with some intervention, they may become productive members of society.57 To this end, Cubans have established prevention commissions at
both the national and local levels that implement strategies to deter criminal behavior and thereby lessen the need to exclude from society those
who manifest criminal tendencies.58
Cuban criminologists have been more concerned with examining crime
as an outgrowth of poverty and market forces than with contemplating
deterrence.59 Cuba’s Penal Code, amended in 1979 for the first time in
forty years, eliminated those penal norms that “no longer correspond

(Sven-Axel Månsson & Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes eds., 2005); Ofelia de los Milagros
García Cueto, La Violencia, Un Mal Sin Fronteras [Violence, A Harm without Borders],
6 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS MÉDICAS LA HABANA (2000), available at http://www.cpicmha.
sld.cu/hab/vol6_2_00/hab010200.htm.
54. García Cueto, supra note 53.
55. Antoni Kapcia, Setting the Stage for a Discussion of Cuban Civil Society, in THE
CHANGING DYNAMIC OF CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY 20, 25, 27, 35–36 (Alexander I. Gray &
Antoni Kapcia eds., 2008) (noting efforts to work with even those considered enemies of
the revolution).
56. Calderón, supra note 53, at 16.
57. Patricia Grogg, Crime and Counterrevolution, CUBA UPDATE, Nov. 1991, at 30,
31 (1991) (quoting Dr. Fernando Barral, noted Cuban psychiatrist and professor of criminology, who observed that Cuba’s concern with economic crime does not relate to private
property, but with the “economic principle of socialist distribution”) (on file with author);
Interview with sociologist in Havana, Cuba (Oct. 15, 2005).
58. Sheryl L. Lutjens, Schooling and “Clean Streets” in Socialist Cuba: Children
and the Special Period, in CHILDREN ON THE STREETS OF THE AMERICAS: GLOBALIZATION,
HOMELESSNESS AND EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BRAZIL AND CUBA 55, 58 (Roslyn Arlin Mickelson ed., 2000) (referencing prevention commission systems established
through Decree Laws beginning in the early 1980s).
59. See generally Bondeson, supra note 36, at 194 (observing that countries that emphasize a welfare model are likely to have less stringent penal systems); Grogg, supra
note 57.
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with the reality of [Cuban] economic, social and political development.”60 Raúl Gómez Treto, senior advisor to the Cuban Ministry of Justice and President of the Cuban Society for Civil and Family Law, described the 1979 amendments as a paradigm shift that “depenalized” certain crimes—particularly those related to juveniles and families—and redesignated them as antisocial actions committed as a consequence of
economic need or lack of education.61
Other reforms demonstrate that Cubans have reconsidered the efficacy
of criminalization and punishment toward deterrence of ordinary crime.
By the early 1980s, Cuba had again moved purposefully to decriminalize
a number of offenses by changing the character of criminal laws and reducing the use of detention.62 Cuba later eliminated an additional host of
petty offenses and codes of conduct from the Penal Code, while the penalties for other offenses were reduced from imprisonment to fines and
education programs.63
Cuban criminologists tend to approach crime control from pragmatic
and humanitarian perspectives. Professor Caridad Navarette Calderón,
one of Cuba’s foremost criminologists, describes her research as “humanistic social projects” and emphasizes the need to embed problemsolving skills in communities rather than impose punitive responses via
formal criminal justice institutions.64 Her research aims to shift the social
60. DEBRA EVENSON, REVOLUTION IN THE BALANCE 148 (1994).
61. Raúl Gómez Treto, Thirty Years of Cuban Revolutionary Penal Law, LATIN AM.
PERSP., Spring 1991, at 114, 118.
62. MARJORIE S. ZATZ, PRODUCING LEGALITY: LAW AND SOCIALISM IN CUBA 71
(1994); Mary Lamey, Mariela Castro Speaks out for Cuba’s Gay Minority, THE GAZETTE
(Montreal), July 29, 2006, at A7 (noting the decriminalization of sodomy). Other matters,
such as nonpayment of rent, while not a criminal matter, were removed from the courts.
See Robert Cantor, New Laws for a New Society, CUBA RESOURCE NEWSL., Dec. 1973, at
3, 3.
63. See EVENSON, supra note 60, at 151–52; Cantor, supra note 62, at 3; Jean Stubbs,
Book Review, 17 J. L. & SOC’Y 389, 391 (1990) (reviewing ADELE G. VAN DER PLAS,
REVOLUTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE CUBAN EXPERIMENT, 1959–1983). The U.S.
State Department has also noted the depenalization of petty offenses in Cuba. See Human
Rights In Cuba: An Update, U.S. DEP’T ST. BULL., April, 1989, at 59, available at http://
www.archive.org/details/departmentofstatb89unit.
64. Interview with Dr. Caridad Navarrete Calderón in Havana, Cuba (Oct. 12, 2005);
see also Caridad Navarrete Calderón, Caracterización Criminológica Victimológica de
Mujeres Comisoras de Lesiones de Ciudad de la Habana [Criminological Victimological
Characterization of Women Assaulters in Havana], ILANUD: REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO
LATINOAMERICANO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LA PREVENCIÓN DEL DELITO Y EL
TRATAMIENTO DEL DELICUENTE, 2006, at 235, 239–40, available at http://ilanud.or.cr/
revista27.html [hereinafter Characterization of Women Assaulters]; Marjorie S. Zatz &
James H. McDonald, Structural Control and Ideology Consistency: Changes in the Form
and Content of Cuban Criminal Law, in MAKING LAW: THE STATE, THE LAW AND
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meanings of crime, encourage mutual aid, and improve the distribution
of goods and services in order to ameliorate conditions commonly associated with crime and deviance.65
Policymakers now subscribe to this belief in community mediation as
social control and encourage its exercise in multiple spheres—
particularly by the popular organizations assigned to civic tasks—as a
form of preventative intervention.66
B. Participatory Mechanisms as a Means of Social Control
1. Overview of Cuban Organizations
The Cuban revolution established four principal mass organizations, all
of which function within the framework of the Cuban approach to social
controls as a means of mobilizing the public to carry out centrally determined objectives. They include the Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution (“CDR”), the Federation of Cuban Women (“FMC”), the
Confederation of Cuban Workers (“CTC”), and the National Organization of Small Agriculturists (“ANAP”).67 Since the revolution, the CDRs
have provided vigilance against counter-revolutionary activity and crime
in neighborhoods and work places.68 The FMC’s initial objective was to

STRUCTURAL CONTRADICTIONS 127, 141 (William J. Chambliss & Marjorie S. Zatz eds.,
1993) (noting that Cubans determined to reserve “use of the criminal sanction as a last
resort, and within that, incarceration as the last resort”).
65. Berta E. Hernández-Truyol, Cuba and Good Governance, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 655, 668–669, 671–81 (2004) (noting Cuba’s achievements and high
scores according to the United Nations’ Human Development Index in areas such as the
eradication of hunger, universal education, health, and the “equitable promotion of social
and economic development for the benefit of all citizens”); see also Donald W. Bray &
Marjorie Woodford Bray, Introduction: The Cuban Revolution and World Change, 29
LATIN AM. PERSP., May 2002, at 3, 4 (noting that in 2001, the president of the World
Bank observed that Cuba had excelled in providing for the social welfare of its people).
66. Interview with Dr. Caridad Navarrete Calderón, supra note 64; see also COHEN,
supra note 38, at 127, 265 (describing how community controls can respond to “genuine
psychic and social needs”); Fagan & Meares, supra note 50, at 186–87 (noting that ways
that communities may be structured through networks and community groups will impact
the degree of criminal behavior in that community).
67. For a thorough treatment of Cuban mass organizations, see generally FAGEN,
supra note 30.
68. See Rhoda Pearl Rabkin, Cuban Political Structure: Vanguard Party and the
Masses, in CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION, 1959 TO 1984, at 251, 263 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1985).
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incorporate women into the realm of productive labor.69 Currently, the
FMC establishes programs to assist women and families with many facets of day-to-day life, including health concerns, family violence, gender discrimination, educational programs, and employment issues.70 The
CTC, described as “representative of the entire working class of Cuba,”
works to further Cuba’s post-1959 political, social, and economic agenda, often through legislative proposals and initiatives.71 The ANAP
sought to incorporate peasants and small farmers into the efforts to fulfill
the objectives of the revolutionary project.72
While much has been written about these organizations elsewhere, the
relevant part for purposes of understanding the Cuban approach to ordinary crime is the door-to-door and block-by-block processes by which
these organizations operate.73 In order to carry out their overall mission
and their individual tasks, they have created an infrastructure that also
serves as the foundation for social controls and crime prevention.
In addition to these mass organizations, over 2,000 local civic associations have emerged across the island over the past fifteen years, largely
in response to the post-Soviet economic crisis.74 These civic associations
include neighborhood development associations, religious groups, and
fraternal, cultural, and sports organizations.75 They have obtained official
support due to their their commitment to national norms and their ability
to respond to crisis situations and fulfill various critical needs that are left

69. Lois M. Smith & Alfred Padula, The Cuban Family in the 1980s, in
TRANSFORMATION AND STRUGGLE: CUBA FACES THE 1990S, at 175, 178 (Sandor Halebsky
& John M. Kirk, eds. 1990).
70. See the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences: Addendum: Report on the Mission to Cuba, ¶¶ 12, 42, 74, delivered to the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC] Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/68/Add.2 (Feb. 8, 2000)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur’s Report].
71. Rabkin, supra note 68, at 264. The CTC was actually established prior to the
revolution but came under the control of the Cuban government after 1959. Id.; see also
Peter Roman, Representative Government in Socialist Cuba, LATIN AM. PERSP., Winter
1993, at 7, 19.
72. PÉREZ, JR., CUBA, supra note 30, at 330.
73. See infra Part II(B)(2).
74. See Haroldo Dilla & Philip Oxhorn, The Virtues and Misfortunes of Civil Society
in Cuba, LATIN AM. PERSP., July 2002, at 11, 17. See generally Miren Uriarte, Social
Policy Responses to Cuba’s Economic Crisis of the 1990s, 35 CUBAN STUDIES 105
(2004).
75. Dilla & Oxhorn, supra note 74, at 16–20.
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unattended by a weakened centralized bureaucracy.76 Local organizations
have become the sites of debates, particularly debates as to what are the
most efficient means of resolving problems caused by shortages and the
decline in general day-to-day living conditions.77 As neighborhood
projects, they incorporate vulnerable populations into community selfhelp endeavors and social service initiatives.78 Many of the local organizations function as social science laboratories.79
Mass and local organizations function at all levels of society: within
the family and inside households, in neighborhoods and at workplaces.
These organizations encourage a dynamic process of citizen-to-citizen
involvement and address the conditions that contribute to crime. It is out
of these very structures that the logic of social controls and crime in Cuba emerges. The focus is on fixing the broken window rather than criminalizing the window breaker.80
2. Social Capital and Crime Prevention through
Distribution of Public Goods
Most Cuban organizations were designed to facilitate cooperative action associated with improving the quality of day-to-day life of individuals and communities. As such, they contribute to the development of social capital—the means by which individuals and groups obtain material
and social benefits through network connections and participation in civic organizations.81 Social capital not only yields a broad range of resources for use and exchange by citizen participants, but has also been
76. Id.; Gray & Kapcia, supra note 7, at 11, 12 (noting that groups outside of formal
structures do not challenge the government and describing the 1993 Association Act,
which made it easier for groups to register as NGOs).
77. Antoni Kapcia, Lessons of the Special Period, LAT. AMER. PERSP., Jan. 2009, at
30, 33.
78. See infra notes 83–85, 89, 99–101 and accompanying text.
79. Interview with the Department of Sociology of the University of Havana in Havana, Cuba (Nov. 14, 2007) (discussing projects led by university researchers with students and community residents to explore and experiment with solutions to neighborhood
problems, many of which bear on crime and criminal behavior).
80. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 342 (1998). The “Broken Windows”
policing strategy relied on police for intense enforcement of laws on minor “quality of
life” offenses coupled with the aggressive stops and searches of citizens. See Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of
Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING:
NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 309 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010).
81. Susan Saegert & Gary Winkel, Crime, Social Capital, and Community Participation, 34 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 219, 221 (2004).
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demonstrated to reduce rates of crime by creating community trust and
investing in social welfare through the distribution of public goods.82
The mass organizations’ core projects clearly demonstrate these phenomena. The functions to which Cuban organizations dedicate themselves—including economic development, housing construction and repairs, and improvement of employment and workplace conditions—
directly develop social capital through network exchanges and citizen
cooperation.83 The CDRs, the FMC, the ANAP, and the CTC engage
citizens in the type of efforts that promote social welfare and improve
living conditions, such as: literacy campaigns, door-to-door book distributions, provision of daycare services, child development initiatives,
school attendance programs, and educational programs for workers and
farmers.84

82. ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND
TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 141 (1993) (observing that the link between increased
social capital and social control theory relating to crime is “straightforward”); Coleman,
supra note 42, at S98 (defining social capital as “making possible the achievement of
certain ends that in its absence would not be possible”); Katherine Beckett & Bruce
Western, Growing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the Transformation of
State Policy, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 35, 46 (David
Garland ed., 2001); see also Nan Lin, Building a Network Theory of Social Capital, in
SOCIAL CAPITAL: THEORY AND RESEARCH 3–5 (Nan Lin et al. eds., 2001).
83. BENGELSDORF, supra note 30, at 85; JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND
REVOLUTION 261 (1978); FAGEN, supra note 30, at 88, 91; Marguerite G. Rosenthal, The
Problems of Single Motherhood in Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: CRISIS AND
TRANSFORMATION 161 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1992) (noting the FMC’s
economic support for single mothers); see also Smith & Padula, supra note 69, at 178.
84. BENGELSDORF, supra note 30, at 85; FAGEN, supra note 30, at 88; Domínguez,
supra note 83, at 261, 268 (noting, for example, the 95% rate of attendance in schools);
Gail Lindenberg, The Labor Union in the Cuban Workplace, LATIN AM. PERSP., Winter
1993, at 28, 28–30; Smith & Padula, supra note 69, at 178. The CDRs developed “exemplary parenthood,” in which parents maintain active involvement in schools, and both
parents and children conform to school regulations. DEBRA EVENSON, WORKERS IN CUBA:
UNIONS AND LABOR RELATIONS 14 (2002) (describing worker programs to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of their worksites); Margo Kirk, Early Childhood Education in
Revolutionary Cuba During the Special Period, in A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER:
REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION 302, 305 (Philip Brenner et al. eds., 2008) (noting that the
burdens of raising families fall to community); Marifeli Pérez-Stable, Socialism and Democracy: Some Thoughts After 30 Years of Revolution in Cuba, in TRANSFORMATION AND
STRUGGLE: CUBA FACES THE 1990S, at 21, 26–29 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds.,
1990); Andrew Zimbalist, Cuban Economic Planning: Organization and Performance, in
CUBA: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION, 1959 TO 1984, at 213, 220 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1985); see also Eliza Barclay, Greening Cuba, ENVTL.
MAG., May–June 2004, at 18; OXFAM AMERICA, CUBA: GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN, Chap.
II, at 4, Chap. III, at 8–9 (2001), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/
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Similarly, local groups such as the Neighborhood Transformation
Workshops (Talleres de Transformación Integral del Barrio) assist with
the distribution of health care services, workplace safety protections, and
vaccination programs.85 They undertake public works projects to improve street lighting and other physical conditions of neighborhoods.86
They foster a sense of inclusion in community projects and enhance the
processes of cooperative problem-solving.87 These organizations—both
mass and local—address poor living conditions, lack of day-to-day resources, limited education, and diminished economic opportunities, all of
which are readily associated with crime.88 They bear directly on the conditions that, when left unaddressed, often give way to community disrepair, family despair, and deviance. To the extent that Cuban organizations succeed in their goals, they also confer legitimacy on governmental
initiatives and, thus, contribute to compliance with social and legal
norms.89
3. Collective Supervision and the Complexities of Categorizing Deviance
Participatory structures function in two additional and related ways as
a means of crime prevention via social control. First, they collectively
supervise residents in cities and in rural areas throughout the island, often
in ways that are directly related to crime control. Indeed, crime prevention is a matter of specific concern to most organizations. Citizens often
prefer to turn to the CDRs to remedy wrongs and resolve local disputes

cuba-going-against-the-grain; Maria Gropas, Landscape, Revolution and Property Regimes in Rural Havana, 33 J. PEASANT STUD. 248, 257 (2006).
85. Andrea Colantonio & Robert B. Potter, Participatory and Collaborative Planning
in ‘Special Period’ Cuba, in PARTICIPATORY PLANNING IN THE CARIBBEAN: LESSONS
FROM PRACTICE 68, 89 (Jonathan Pugh & Robert B. Potter eds., 2003); Uriarte, supra
note 74, at 124–28.
86. Colantonio & Potter, supra note 85, at 82–83; Uriarte, supra note 74, at 121–23.
87. Antoni Kapcia, Educational Revolution and Revolutionary Morality in Cuba: The
‘New Man,’ Youth and the New ‘Battle of Ideas,’ 34 J. MORAL EDUC. 399, 407 (2005);
Saegert & Winkel, supra note 81, at 230.
88. John F. Wozniak, Poverty and Peacemaking Criminology: Beyond Mainstream
Criminology, 16 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 209, 216 (2008).
89. Fagan & Meares, supra note 50, at 188; OXFAM AMERICA, supra note 84, at Chap.
III, at 8 (noting that ANAP’s greening efforts were successful because of their organizational strength and close ties to members).
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rather than seek formal legal relief through the courts.90 The Talleres
have become sites for intervention in family dysfunction and violence.91
Similarly, for matters relating to ordinary crime, workers turn to the
CTC in lieu of formal legal charges.92 For example, one of the most serious problems presented to the CTC has been that of workplace theft.
During Cuba’s Special Period,93 theft of state property increased, creating a significant burden on Cuba’s fragile economy that provoked an
outcry for the imposition of harsh penalties.94 After consideration and
debate, the CTC assumed a preventative approach that focused on reducing opportunities for pilfering and counseling workers, whose rehabilitation was considered more important than punishment.95
Even when not specifically addressing crime, mass organizations serve
as sites where knowledge about crime and deviance is gained and from
which responses are formulated.96 CDR volunteers have direct contact
with residents, and are each responsible for a given neighborhood.97
They rely on retired residents who are frequently at home and who take
note of suspected criminal activity in their neighborhoods so that they
may intervene before serious problems develop.98 The FMC has maintained what scholars have termed a “ubiquitous presence” in neighborhoods; organizers go door-to-door visiting homes to fulfill their tasks and
conduct studies and surveys.99 They are uniquely positioned to identify
90. DOMÍNGUEZ, supra note 83, at 265 (noting that CDR activities related to vigilance
have been redirected to ordinary crime); Debra Evenson, The Changing Role of Law in
Revolutionary Cuba, in TRANSFORMATION AND STRUGGLE: CUBA FACES THE 1990S 53, 56
(Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1990).
91. Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes, A Self-Help Group for Battered Women, in SOCIAL
WORK IN CUBA AND SWEDEN 211, 218 (Sven-Axel Månsson & Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes eds., 2005).
92. Evenson, supra note 90, at 56; Mark H. Kruger, Community-Based Crime Control
in Cuba, 10 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 101, 108 (2007) (noting that union assemblies have
become the sites for determining the best ways to deal with crime in the workplace).
93. Cuba declared a “Special Period in Time of Peace” in 1990 in response to the
economic collapse occasioned by the demise of the Soviet Union, its key trading partner
and provider of subsidies. See Hernández & Dilla, supra note 26, at 23.
94. Evenson, supra note 90, at 69.
95. Id.
96. See GARLAND, supra note 44, at 205.
97. FAGEN, supra note 30, at 92; PÉREZ, JR., CUBA, supra note 30, at 330.
98. Kruger, supra note 92, at 108; see also infra notes 332–33 and accompanying text
(contrasting neighborhood watch programs in the United States with the Cuban system).
99. Alexander I. Gray, The Genesis of NGO Participation in Contemporary Cuba, in
THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY 160, 161 (Alexander I. Gray & Antoni Kapcia eds., 2008) (noting that 85% of women over the age of 14 belong to the FMC);
Rosenthal, supra note 83, at 161 (noting FMC support for single mothers); see also Smith
& Padula, supra note 69, at 178.
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community problems and gain knowledge of household dynamics.100 The
Talleres rely on a social work case-management model and make use of
the block-by-block infrastructure already put in place by the CDRs in
order to provide services.101 They have also established research and
evaluation teams to observe and report on neighborhood conditions.102
These day-to-day encounters combine to form the participatory mechanisms by which Cubans collectively supervise one another from within
groups of law-abiding individuals acting in bounded solidarity to preserve order and protect the vulnerable.103
The second explanation for how participatory structures facilitate
crime prevention is that it becomes a more difficult proposition to exclude individuals for deviant behavior in societies where members share
deep commitments to sustaining communities and assume obligations for
mutual wellbeing. John Braithwaite has described this mutual caretaking
as a social corollary to such communal social structures.104 In this context, “[T]he complex experience that people have of each other makes it
more difficult to squeeze the identities of offenders into crude master
categories of deviance.”105 Other scholars refer to the dynamic of “linked
fate” as a phenomenon of empathy among community members that affects responses to crime.106
These dynamics describe circumstances in Cuba, where organizational
processes bring individuals into close proximity to one another for purposes of solidarity and support. Members engage with neighbors and coworkers, and identify with each other’s daily problems, particularly the
very circumstances that may give rise to disaffection and deviance.107
100. Sarah M. Santana, Whither Cuban Medicine? Challenges for the Next Generation, in TRANSFORMATION AND STRUGGLE: CUBA FACES THE 1990S, at 251, 251–53, 266
(Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1990).
101. Lourdes Pérez Montalvo, Social Work Experience in Cuba, J. CUBAN AM.
ALLIANCE, Feb. 2002, at 5, available at http://www.redandgreen.org/Cuba/Social_Work/
sw05-lourdes.htm; Uriarte, supra note 74, at 125–26, 128.
102. Colantonio & Potter, supra note 85, at 88; Pérez Montalvo, supra note 101.
103. Kruger, supra note 92, at 101; see also Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner,
Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action,
98 AM. J. SOC. 1320, 1324 (1993) (describing sources of social capital and principled
group-oriented behavior); Kapcia, supra note 55, at 32 (describing the process of enlisting the older population that comprise the Asociación de Combatientes de la Revolución
to guard against crime in their neighborhoods).
104. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 97 (1989).
105. Id.
106. Fagan & Meares, supra note 50, at 222–23 (citing MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND
THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (1994).
107. Miren Uriarte, Rediscovering Lo Local: The Potential and the Limits of Local
Development in Havana, in THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY 90, 110
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When community members identify deviant behavior, they are more
likely to seek services than to punish.
The methods by which the CTC carries out its functions provide an example of the phenomenon of linked fate. CTC members collaborate to
establish wages and set material incentives. In determining allocations,
they consider not only worker productivity but also individual needs.108
Through these deliberations, co-workers gain knowledge of family composition, living conditions, health, and other hardships and circumstances.109 A similar process takes place through ANAP’s deliberative
processes, by which decisions are made as to how to allocate resources to
support individual families.110
These mutual dependencies act to reduce the traditional monopolistic
control exercised by formal criminal justice systems over criminal behavior. Because of the commonplace nature of civic participation in matters
related to neighborhood wellbeing, the boundaries of participation are
defined only vaguely and readily yield to intervention on behalf of individuals and families in lieu of resort to formal criminal justice mechanisms.
This is not to suggest that these organizations always function constructively. Surveillance is at times an intrusive practice, one used as a
mechanism of intimidation. It not infrequently passes into the realm of
harassment.111 The CDRs have carried out repressive acts, such as denouncing and detaining suspected counter-revolutionaries.112 Neighbors
have informed on one another, often resulting in unwarranted accusations.113 The mass organizations have also suffered from corruption, offi(Alexander I. Gray & Antoni Kapcia eds., 2008) (noting that as a result of the Talleres,
Cubans gain familiarity with the needs of their community); Gail Reed, From SiCKO to
SALUD: The Truth About the Cuban Health Care System, HUFFINGTON POST, July 15,
2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gail-reed/from-sicko-to-e_b_56308.html (describing nurses making house calls to check on the elderly and to remind people about their
checkups).
108. Richard L. Harris, Bureaucracy Versus Democracy in Contemporary Cuba: An
Assessment of Thirty Years of Organizational Development, in CUBA IN TRANSITION:
CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION 77, 83 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1992);
Evenson, supra note 84, at 24; Zimbalist, supra note 84, at 219.
109. Lindenberg, supra note 84, at 35 (noting that services and housing were fairly
distributed, taking into consideration workers’ “pressing needs”); Zimbalist, supra note
84, at 220.
110. DOMÍNGUEZ, supra note 83, at 303; Gropas, supra note 84, at 264.
111. Benigno E. Aguirre, Social Control in Cuba, LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y, Summer
2002, at 67, 78 (describing the Rapid Response Brigades that forcefully repressed activity
deemed counter-revolutionary).
112. Id.
113. BENGELSDORF, supra note 30, at 85; FAGEN, supra note 30, at 96.
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ciousness, and bureaucratic stagnation.114 Moreover, the success of these
organizations has varied from neighborhood to neighborhood and has
been hampered by the scarcity of material resources and local political
leadership.115 But in matters related to the facets of everyday life, these
organizations have been generally successful in controlling crime. They
do so by improving living and working conditions, and fostering the necessary circumstances for the development among ordinary Cubans of
empathetic relationships that impede the imposition of categorical stigma
on those who exhibit deviant behavior.116
III. ORDINARY CRIME: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY
A review of the Cuban approach to domestic violence and juvenile delinquency serves as a case study of the ways political culture and social
controls interact to produce a coherent and generally successful policy
response to crime.
Cubans have focused on promoting norms of gender equality and social solidarity as the principal means to deter violence against women.
Cuban criminologists proceed from two assumptions—(1) education can
change gender norms that contribute to domestic violence117 and (2) attention to the material needs of households supports an environment
conducive to stable, violence-free families.118
Similarly, the dominant response to juvenile delinquency in Cuba has
focused not on punishment but on prevention strategies that privilege the
delivery of services to children, families, and communities. Cubans have
been careful to avoid stigmatizing youth who exhibit deviant behavior.
Instead, they emphasize social work methodologies as a means to attend

114. FAGEN, supra note 30, at 100.
115. Colantonio & Potter, supra note 85, at 94–95.
116. Santana, supra note 100, at 262; see also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 104, at 88; Jill
Hamberg, Cuban Housing Policy, in TRANSFORMATION AND STRUGGLE: CUBA FACES THE
1990S, at 235, 246 (Sandor Halebsky & John M. Kirk eds., 1990).
117. Ellen Hardy & Ana Luisa Jiménez, Masculinidad y Género [Masculinity and
Gender], 27 REVISTA CUBANA DE SALUD PÚBLICA 77, 79 (2001).
118. Caridad Navarrete Calderón, El Impacto de la Investigación-acción Participativa
en la Actividad Preventiva Social y Criminológica [The Impact of Participative Investigation-Action in Social and Criminological Preventive Activity], ANUARIO DEL CENTRO
DE INVESTIGACIONES JURÍDICAS 12 (2006) (Cuba), available at http://cij.minjus.cu/pdf/
anuario2006/04accion/04accion.pdf (noting that prevention projects have as a goal the
improvement of material conditions for families); Characterization of Women Assaulters,
supra note 64, at 236.
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to family dynamics, child-rearing, and community activities that nurture
and teach social values.119
In both instances, formal legal responses eschew punitive crime control
measures120—Cuba’s laws mandate prevention rather than punishment
and are thus constitutive of the informal processes that serve as the primary means to address domestic violence and juvenile crimes. They produce normative changes and incorporate potential perpetrators into dominant social structures as a way to prevent criminal activity.
A. Domestic Violence
1. Gender Equality as a Framework121
Cuban criminologists who specialize in domestic violence have argued
that eradicating gender-based violence first requires the transformation of
relationships between men and women, with a focus on women’s equality.122 An understanding of the Cuban approach to the former requires an
examination of developments toward achieving the latter.
Among the many things that changed in Cuba after 1959 was the expanded presence and participation of women in public realms. New possibilities provided vast numbers of women with a new sense of purpose
and significantly altered the gender determinants of daily life, at least
during the early years. With the triumph of revolution, Cuba initiated a
National Development Strategy to eliminate all forms of discrimination
and to address women’s issues specifically.123 The FMC established day

119. Calderón, supra note 118, at 13.
120. See infra notes 166–68, 193–95, 198, 282–83 and accompanying text.
121. Much has been written elsewhere about demonstrable improvement of equality
for women in Cuba. See generally LOIS M. SMITH & ALFRED PADULA, SEX AND
REVOLUTION: WOMEN IN SOCIALIST CUBA (1996); MARGARET RANDALL, WOMEN IN
CUBA: TWENTY YEARS LATER (1981); Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Building
Bridges V—Cubans Without Borders: Mujeres Unidas Por Su Historia [Women United
by their History], 55 FLA. L. REV. 225 (2003); Hernández-Truyol, supra note 65, at 672.
122. See infra notes 158, 166 and accompanying text.
123. Lois M. Smith & Alfred Padula, Book Review, 13 CUBAN STUDIES/ESTUDIOS
CUBANOS 127, 128 (1983) (reviewing INGER HOLT-SEELAND, WOMEN OF CUBA (1982),
MARGARET RANDALL, WOMEN IN CUBA—TWENTY YEARS LATER (1981), and WOMEN
AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (Elizabeth Stone ed. 1981) (noting the commitment of state
resources toward the goal of advancing women’s equality); Press Release, Comm. on
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Cuba Striving Hard to Eliminate Persistent Stereotypes, Women’s Inequality, Deputy Foreign Minister Says, as Women’s
Committee Considers Latest Country Report (Aug. 8, 2006), available at http://www.un.
org/News/Press/docs/2006/wom1570.doc.htm [hereinafter Press Release: Cuba Striving
Hard].
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care centers, laundries, state-run cafeterias, and take-out restaurants as
part of an effort to socialize domestic work.124
State-run television has altered programming narratives in an effort to
change depictions of socially constructed gender roles in the home.125
Educators revised school texts and educational curricula to depict women
as fully capable persons integrated into all levels of society.126 Child development experts have introduced new children’s play activities to dismantle traditional roles assigned by sex.127 Cubans have increasingly accepted same-sex relationships, gay marriage, and transgendered identities
while grappling with the problematic masculine discourse associated
with the revolution and traditions of machismo.128
Legal reforms have also served as an expression of gender equality.
Although lacking enforcement mechanisms, the 1975 Cuban Family
Code required an equal division of housework and child care between
husbands and wives.129 The 1976 Constitution addressed women’s issues
(particularly the problem of the double shift), established standards for
marriage as an equal partnership, and proclaimed equal political, economic, and social rights as between husbands and wives, and men and

124. Smith & Padula, supra note 123, at 129; Elizabeth Stone, Introduction, in WOMEN
6, 16 (Elizabeth Stone ed., 1981).
125. Gail Reed, The Media on Women: Caught Napping, CUBA UPDATE, Summer
1991, at 15, 17 (contrasting recent television productions that have featured strong women as central characters with a popular cartoon, “The Little Pumpkin,” which has typically reinforced traditional gender stereotypes but has recently made one of the primary
caretaker figures male).
126. Cuba, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
Fourth Periodic Report of Cuba, 116–17, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CUB/4 (Sept. 27, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm (scroll to Cuba)
[hereinafter CEDAW Report].
127. Id. at 118.
128. ILJA A. LUCIAK, GENDER AND DEMOCRACY IN CUBA 31 (2007) (describing debates
about changing the machista nature of the peasant sector); Ana Serra, The ‘New Woman’
in Cuban Revolutionary Discourse: Manuel Cofiño’s The Last Woman and the Next
Combat (1971), 14 J. GENDER STUD. 33, 34 (2005). Despite significant concerns about
attitudes toward homosexuality, especially during the early 1980s when the HIV epidemic gained public attention, Cuba has demonstrated a significant improvement with regard
to its position on same-sex relationships and transgendered identities. Dalia Acosta, Gay
JOURNAL,
June
16,
2007,
Marriage
Coming
to
Cuba?,
HAVANA
http://havanajournal.com/culture/entry/gay-marriage-coming-to-cuba-2882/.
129. CODIGO DE LA FAMILIA, Arts. 24–28, available at http://www.informaticajuridica.com/legislacion/Cuba_Codigo_Familia.asp; Marjorie King, Cuba’s Attack on
Women’s Second Shift 1974–1976, LATIN AM. PERSP., Winter-Spring 1977, at 106, 108
(citing articles 24–28 of the Cuban Family Code).
AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
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women, generally.130 Labor laws similarly extended rights and protections to women.131 Cuba has led by example with regard to international
protocols and gender-based equality. It was the first country to sign the
Convention to End Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)132 and it
subsequently signed the treaty’s optional protocol allowing individual
complaints to proceed before international bodies for adjudication.133
This is not to suggest that Cuban women have achieved full equality
within Cuban society.134 However, efforts to integrate women into all
levels of society and eliminate stereotypes through innovative and multiinstitutional means have yielded significant achievements.135 Women’s
progress in education, employment, and health has been described as
“enviable.”136 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
found that the Cuban revolution has “put [Cuban women] in a better position statistically than most of their Latin American counterparts,”137 and
the status of women in Cuba compares favorably with industrialized capitalist countries.138

130. King, supra note 129, at 109–10.
131. CEDAW Report, supra note 126, at 75.
132. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], Report
of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 198–228, delivered
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/38 (May 9, 1996), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/type,SESSIONALREPORT,CEDAW,,3f559fa14,0.html [hereinafter
CEDAW Concluding Observations].
133. Cuba signed the CEDAW treaty in March 1980, CEDAW: States Parties,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (follow link to “Ratification,
Accessions and Successions”) (last visited Feb. 13, 2010), and the optional protocol in
March 2000, CEDAW: Signatures to and Ratifications of the Optional Protocol, http://
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/sigop.htm (follow link to “Ratification,
Accessions and Successions”) (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
134. María López Vigil, Heroines of the Special Period, in A CONTEMPORARY CUBA
READER: REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION 309 (Philip Brenner et al. eds., 2008); Carolina
Aguilar & Rita María Pereira, The Challenges of Daily Life, 9 CUBA UPDATE, June
1995, at 9 (noting that many of hardships of the 1990s were borne by women).
135. CEDAW Report, supra note 126, at 111; Raisa Pagés, The Status of Cuban Women: From Economically Dependent to Independent, in A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER:
REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION 311 (Philip Brenner et al. eds., 2008).
136. Hernández-Truyol, supra note 65, at 672–73; see also Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 10.
137. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 10, 68.
138. Stone, supra note 124, at 5. The New York City Commission on the Status of
Women sought the expertise of Cuban specialists on family matters, the status of women,
and the best practices for institutional change. Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The
Nylon Curtain: America’s National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 719, 726 n.29 (1985).
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2. Domestic Violence Prevention and Intervention
In Cuba, as elsewhere, the complexity of domestic violence is understood as arising from structural social relationships that include discrimination, isolation, and poverty.139 The FMC anticipated that domestic violence would cease with changed material conditions.140 However, with
the recognition of the persistence of violence against women, that viewpoint changed and the FMC urged greater attention to the issue.141 Activists argued that in order to fulfill the humanist social project, domestic
violence had to be addressed not only because of its consequences for
families, but because of the significance of nonviolence as a normative
matter.142
a. Definitions and Determinants
Cubans generally adhere to the conventional definition of domestic violence as physical, emotional, and psychological violence committed
within intimate relationships.143 However, social cohesion among neighbors and established norms of gender equality have influenced the way
Cubans conceive of the problem, which has led to expansion of the definition beyond paradigmatic characterizations. For example, Cubans have
described domestic violence as harms that occur in other types of relationships (not just between intimates). Respondents asked to identify
domestic violence in a 1993 study included not only disputes between
intimate couples, but also arguments between coworkers, as well as arguments between people while on shopping lines.144
Similarly, behaviors beyond the prototypical acts usually associated
with gender-based violence are considered forms of domestic violence.145
139. Characterization of Women Assaulters, supra note 64, at 240–41. The FMC addresses domestic violence from the point of view that the social construction of gender
roles contributes to the social and political problems that Cuban women continue to face.
See CEDAW Report, supra note 126, at 40; Caroline Bettinger-López, Human Rights at
Home: Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Violation, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
19, 67 (2008) (identifying the structural nature of domestic violence).
140. LUCIAK, supra note 128, at 35 (describing the FMC’s “triumphalist discourse”).
141. Id. at 35–36.
142. See Characterization of Women Assaulters, supra note 64, at 239 (implying that
non-violence is of the highest values to which Cubans must aspire in their daily lives).
143. Ángel Marqués Dolz, Estadísticas Sin Rimel: La Cuba Patriarcal Goza De Salud,
CUBA A LA MANO, Apr. 2008, http://cubaalamano.net/sitio/client/article.php?id=9930
(noting that domestic violence is predominantly expressed as psychological and physical
violence).
144. Celeste Bermúdes Salvón & Mirta Rodriguez Calderón, Laws and Aspects of
Domestic Violence 10 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
145. Edith, infra note 147.
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In a 1995 study, women respondents identified the most common form of
gender-based violence as the imbalance in workload between men and
women.146 Some cited the transmission of the HIV virus as a form of
gender-based violence.147 Others have identified “the silent treatment,”
where one partner stops talking with the other, as a particularly Cuban
form of intimate violence.148
There is general consensus among FMC organizers and scholars about
the political and economic determinants of domestic violence.149 Writing
for the Center for Legal Research of the Ministry of Justice, Caridad Navarette Calderón argues that the sources of domestic violence range from
meta-systems (e.g., the U.S. embargo and its attendant deprivations and
stress) to micro-systems and personal traits (e.g., socially constructed
norms relating to male dominance and female submission).150 A similar
point of view was repeated in interviews with the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, during which Cubans expressed disagreement with the U.N. focus on individual violence experienced as
physical, sexual, or psychological violence. The Cubans argued instead
that it was a matter of violence against women that Cuban women suffered from structural violence and economic exploitation largely as a
result of U.S.-imposed economic sanctions.151
Cuban experts rank socioeconomic conditions—particularly housing
shortages, unemployment, low levels of education, poor health, and consequential substance abuse—among the primary risk factors for domestic
violence.152 These experts point to poor communication skills and low
146. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 28 (citing a study in Pinar del
Rio). The authors were given the same response in an interview with a male attorney and
his wife from Havana on March 10, 2007.
147. See Dixie Edith, Un Camino Contra La Violencia De Género [A Path against
Gender Violence], Oct. 15, 2007, http://redsemlac-cuba.net/Genero/Un-camino-contra-laviolencia-de-genero.html.
148. Interview with professor of law of the University of Havana in Havana, Cuba
(Oct. 14, 2003); Interview with nurse at health clinic in Habana Vieja, Cuba (Oct. 12–13,
2005); Interview with male attorney from Havana and his wife in Havana, Cuba (March
12, 2007); see also Sara Más, Cuba: Ver Más Allá De Los Golpes [Cuba: See beyond the
Shock], SEMLAC, Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/2007/070115.htm#
Cuba:_Ver_m%C3%A1s_all%C3%A1_de_los_golpes.
149. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
150. Characterization of Women Assaulters, supra note 64, at 239–41. Meta systems
also encompass socially constructed norms relating to male dominance and female submission. Id. at 241 (criticizing gender stereotypes of women as weak, sentimental, and
suffering, and men as strong, intelligent, and powerful).
151. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 69.
152. Characterization of Women Assaulters, supra note 64, at 240–41; Raquel Sierra,
Cuba: Alcohol y Violencia, Dos Males De Alto Riesgo [Alcohol and Violence: Two High-
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self-esteem as personal contributing characteristics of a secondary nature.153 These explanations share the premise that the sources of domestic
violence are found in the social environment of daily life, rather than in
individual characteristics and behavior. They are the framework by
which Cubans endeavor to prevent and respond to domestic violence.
b. Cuban Responses to Domestic Violence
Cubans formulate their responses to domestic violence by starting with
the conviction that the political and economic determinants of such behaviors must be addressed in a manner consistent with the prevailing
views about ordinary crime. First, experts and policy makers emphasize
the need for research and policy initiatives to address the sources of domestic violence. Second, participatory organizations, particularly the
FMC, summon their members to provide victims and perpetrators with a
range of services.154 The third response involves legal action to promote
the first two strategies by mandating research and prevention efforts.155
Legal strategies, of course, also operate within the formal criminal justice
system, but these too are designed to maximize services and integrate the
perpetrator into the community.
(1) Research and Policy Initiatives
Theoretical criminology has had a direct and profound influence on
domestic violence responses in Cuba. The National Commission on Prevention and Social Attention (Comisiones de Prevención y Atención Social) (“CPAS”) was created in 1986 to study the social aspects of crime
and deviance.156 CPAS established a number of national multiRisk Evils], SEMLAC, Nov. 19, 2007, http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/2007/071119.
htm#Cuba:_Alcohol_y_violencia,_dos_males_de_alto_riesgo. Some experts acknowledge
that blaming domestic violence on drugs and alcohol renders invisible the key issues that
relate to the imbalance of power between victim and perpetrator. See CEDAW Report,
supra note 126, at 160; Sara Más, Cuba: Viejas Creencias Naturalizan La Violencia [Old
Beliefs Naturalize Violence], SEMLAC, Jan. 29, 2007, http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/
2007/070129.htm#Cuba:_Viejas_creencias_naturalizan_la_violencia (describing a study
in which one-third of the respondents identified alcohol or drugs as the cause of domestic
violence); Dalia Acosta & Raquel Sierra, Cuba: Violencia: Tras la Leyenda [Cuba: Violence: Beyond the Legend], SEMLAC, Jul. 3, 2006, http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/
2006/060703.htm#Cuba:_Violencia:_Tras_la_leyenda.
153. Characterization of Women Assaulters, supra note 64, at 241; Más, supra note 148.
154. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 12, 23.
155. See infra Part III(2)(c).
156. THE CUBAN REVOLUTION INTO THE 1990S: CUBAN PERSPECTIVES 181 (Centro de
Estudios Sobre América ed., 1992). CPAS was reauthorized in 2007. See Lourdes Pérez
Navarro, Constituida la Comisión Nacional de Prevención y Atención Social [Constituted

340

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:2

disciplinary research programs and working groups, including one on
domestic violence.157 Much of the research currently focuses on gender
norms and learned behaviors of men and women as the source of power
imbalances that serve to legitimize domestic violence.158
University departments have developed domestic violence research
programs and frequently collaborate with international experts.159 Government offices, including the Attorney General’s Office (Oficina de
Fiscalía General), the Ministry of Public Health, and the Ministry of Justice’s Center for Legal Research, have undertaken domestic violence research initiatives.160 From 2002 to 2003, the Center for Psychological
and Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Psicológicas y
Sociológicas) (“CIPS”) undertook a lengthy study of intra-family violence, and in the process, created survey instruments and methodologies

the National Commission of Prevention and Social Attention], GRANMA, Apr. 27, 2007,
available at http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/2007/04/27/nacional/artic01.html.
157. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 23 (noting the establishment in
1997 of the Working Group for the Prevention of and Attention to Interfamilial Violence); Uriarte, supra note 74, at 120.
158. Sara Más, Cuba: Tradición y Estereotipos en el Camino de la Violencia [Cuba:
Tradition and Stereotypes in the Path of Violence], SEMLAC, Oct. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/2008/081020.htm (citing Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes,
who argues that socially constructed behaviors that teach men to be brave, act without
emotions, and withhold tears, and that teach women to be maternal and caring are root
causes of gender-based violence); Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes, Los Estudios de la Violencia contra la Mujer en las Relaciones de Pareja en Cuba: Una Reflexión Crítica
[Studies of Violence against Women in Intimate Partnerships in Cuba: A Critical Reflection], 2 ACADEMIA 1, 4 (2002), available at http://vsites.unb.br/ceam/nescuba/artigos/
pano106.htm.
159. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at ¶ 20 (noting that the Center on
Women’s Studies examines domestic violence and engages with international experts). In
the last 15 years, one of the Authors, Deborah Weissman, has received invitations and
programs from the FMC to attend and present at various conferences examining violence
against women.
160. Juana Iliana Artiles de León, Violencia De Género: Obstáculos Para Su Prevención y Atención [Gender Violence: Obstacles to Prevention and Attention], 32
SEXOLOGÍA Y SOCIEDAD 21, 21 (2006), available at http://www.cenesex.sld.cu/
webs/Violencia_de_genero_32.htm; Characterization of Women Assaulters, supra note
64, at 236; García Cueto, supra note 53; C. Laura López Angulo et al., Mujeres Maltratadas en la Relación de Pareja: Estudio de Caso desde la Dimensión Motivacional
[Abused Women in the Partner Relationship: Case Study from the Motivational Dimension], 28 SEXOLOGÍA Y SOCIEDAD 9, 10 (2005), available at http://www.cenesex.sld.cu/
webs/mujeres_maltratadas.htm; Uriarte, supra note 74, at 121–22 (quoting one Cuban
sociologist who calls for the “need to transform the existing thinking . . . of caring for
people in a fragmented way and from the perspective of only one area . . . .”).
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for ongoing examination of the issue.161 There is a continual call for
more research and better data collection across several fields of study.162
Over the past two decades, these studies have produced a new framework for approaching the gender determinants of aggression, submission,
and workplace and household roles.163 As noted by the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (in her review of developments
in Cuba), CPAS has trained Cuban officials in matters relating to gender
violence since the late 1990s.164 CPAS has also coordinated community
organizations to conduct workshops and media campaigns to promote
awareness and intervention in cases of domestic violence, with a focus
on gender equality in spousal relationships.165 In 2006, CIPS developed
curricular programs and training sessions for parents on the prevention of
violent behavior within the family, including the disruption of genderdetermined power dynamics.166 Government agencies treat domestic violence as a public health problem and urge families and communities to
alter patterns of patriarchal culture.167
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Cuban research findings is the absence of a call for more stringent application of criminal laws. Clotilde
Proveyer Cervantes, one of Cuba’s most prominent experts in domestic
violence, insists that legal sanctions must be the “last rung of the ladder”—that is, a last resort.168 Her view is that “criminal treatment is not
the solution;” rather, the answer lies in “build[ing] other models of masculinity and femininity that are not conflicting.”169 Her statements

161. See generally ALBERTA DURÁN GONDAR ET AL., CONVIVIR EN FAMILIAS SIN
VIOLENCIA: UNA METODOLOGÍA PARA LA INTERVENCIÓN Y PREVENCIÓN DE LA VIOLENCIA
INTRAFAMILIAR (2005).
162. Characterization of Women Assaulters, supra note 64, at 254.
163. Hardy & Jiménez, supra note 117; Proveyer Cervantes, supra note 158; see also
Marqués Dolz, supra note 143 (noting that those women who have leadership roles assume socially constructed styles reflective of masculine leadership—“women with mustaches”).
164. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note at 70, at 86.
165. Id.
166. Edith, supra note 147; cf. Fagan & Meares, supra note 50, at 196 (“In deterrence
and crime control research, the structure of family life consistently ranks among the most
salient forms of informal social control”).
167. Artiles de León, supra note 160, at 24.
168. Interview by SEMlac Cuba with Dr. Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes, Professor, University of Habana (Nov. 28, 2006), Cuba: El Silencio Nos Vuelve Cómplices [Cuba: Silence Renders Us Accomplices], http://www.mujereshoy.com/secc_n/3586.shtml.
169. Id. Proveyer Cervantes also argues that women should be empowered to see
themselves as other than victim, an outcome rendered less likely if they resort to the
courts. Proveyer Cervantes, supra note 91, at 211.
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represent the prevailing viewpoint, which is derived from theoretical developments that reflect Cuban political culture.170
(2) Controlling Domestic Violence through Participatory Mechanisms
As a result of Cuba’s political culture and the processes of the organizations described in Part II, domestic violence cases are not easily hidden
from neighbors, health care professionals, or community social workers.171 Concepts of a cohesive Cuban society and the moral imperative of
solidaridismo encourage intervention in a number of ways in the household, the neighborhood, and the workplace.172 Maintaining functional
families is a priority in the culture of Cuban organizations.173
The FMC has established “Casas de Orientación de Familia” (Family
Orientation Houses) for victims of domestic violence. Although they do
not provide alternative housing for victims, the Casas offer counseling
and services related to job training and employment.174 FMC activists
have also made use of the performing arts, television, and radio to publicize the idea that gender roles are contributing factors of domestic violence, and to give a public voice to the victims and public attention to
their suffering.175 The FMC also organizes self-help groups designed as
alternatives to the formal legal system, specifically for male perpetrators.176 The Center for Sex Education has also encouraged Cuban citizens
to reconsider socially constructed forms of masculinity that are a risk
170. See Edith, supra note 147 (quoting a prominent film-maker who, after interviewing victims of domestic violence, found that resort to the law was impractical and less
important than providing families with resources).
171. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 28; Interview with physician in
Habana Vieja, Cuba (Dec. 23–24, 2002).
172. Kruger, supra note 92, at 106; Interviews with nurse, social worker, and physician
at health clinic in Habana Vieja, Cuba (Oct. 14, 2005).
173. Uriarte, supra note 74, at 128. Even community groups that work in areas unrelated to gender violence incorporate into their realm of responsibility the identification
and management family violence problems. Interview with three sociologists and two
criminologists in Havana, Cuba (Mar. 9, 2007); Interview with the University of Havana
Department of Sociology, supra note 79.
174. Interviews with members at the Office of the Federation of Cuban Women in
Havana, Cuba (Oct. 13, 2005). Members noted with concern the lack of domestic violence shelters due to Cuba’s housing crisis. Id.; see also Special Rapporteur’s Report,
supra note 70, at ¶ 89, 91.
175. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 92.
176. Interview with three sociologists and two criminologists, supra note 173; Sara
Más, En Cuba, un Espacio para Crecer [In Cuba, Space to Grow], CIMACNOTICIAS, Nov.
16, 2006, http://www.cimacnoticias.com/site/06111603-Violencia-quien-d.15587.0.html
(describing a self-help group’s efforts to rethink domestic violence behavior, including
having men who have been imprisoned use their experiences to teach other men).
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factor for violence and have participated in projects to that end.177
Neighbors often intervene directly with abusers;178 according to one expert’s estimate, they do so in at least 90% of cases involving family violence.179 Furthermore, neighbors may bring perpetrators to FMC programs, and they frequently report abuse to family doctors, who rely on
social workers to investigate and offer services.180
Neighbors may also involve CDR officials, or even the police, at times.
However, most individuals contact authorities for the purpose of encouraging the perpetrator to enter into an informal contract whereby he
agrees to obtain help and change his behavior.181 Social sanctioning is
not uncommon, and neighbors will keep watchful eyes on the home, particularly if they are concerned that the victim is not likely to come forth
to complain.182
c. Legal Responses
Formal legal responses are constitutive of the political culture of participation from which strategies of prevention and social control are derived. The very organizations and commissions that study and coordinate
responses to violence were created by legislation.183 For example, CPAS,
which studies crime, including domestic violence, was mandated by
law.184 Affirmative legal obligations in the 1975 Constitution and the
Family Code include gender equality as a means to address the determinants of gender violence.185 The People’s National Assembly Standing
177. Raquel Sierra, El Machismo Prevaleciente en Muchas Sociedades es un Factor de
Riesgo para la Violencia [The Machismo Prevelant in Many societies is a Risk Factor for
Violence], Feb. 21, 2006, http://migestion.blogia.com/2006/febrero.php; Sara Más, Cuba:
Hombres en Tiempo de Cambio [Men in Times of Change], SEMLAC, July 3, 2006, available
at
http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/2006/060703.htm#Cuba:_Hombres_en_tiempo_de_ca
mbio (noting the 2004 Forum on Masculinity, Diversity and Culture of Peace).
178. Interview with attorney, Office of the Fiscalia (Attorney General) in Yaguajay,
Las Villas, Cuba (Dec. 27, 2002).
179. Interview with Provincial Level Jurist in Havana, Cuba (Oct. 13, 2005).
180. Interviews with nurse, social worker, and physician, supra note 172.
181. Interview with attorney, Office of the Fiscalia, supra note 178.
182. Id.; Interview with Jurist, supra note 179.
183. Gómez Treto, supra note 61, at 121.
184. Id.; see also supra notes 163, 164.
185. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, 1976, Art. 42, available at http://www.
parlamentocubano.cu/; CODIGO DE LA FAMILIA, available at http://www.informaticajuridica.com/legislacion/Cuba_Codigo_Familia.asp; see also Aurora Vázquez Penelas,
Preventative Social Work in Cuba: Challenges and Opportunities of Today, in SOCIAL
WORK IN CUBA AND SWEDEN 103 (Sven-Axel Månsson & Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes
eds., 2005) (observing that all legislation in Cuba has a social dimension).
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Committee for Children, Young People and Equal Rights for Women is
obligated by legislation to counsel, evaluate, research, study, and monitor
matters related to domestic violence.186 Similarly, treaty obligations arising from CEDAW have inspired ongoing efforts relating to equal rights
for women.187
In the last decade, Cubans have given much attention to the implementation of formal criminal laws. Cuba has no specific crime of “domestic
violence,” and this has caused concern and debate. Cuban experts recognize the privileged position that criminal sanctions hold in most countries
with regard to violence against women. They have been pressed by international observers to create specific provisions in the Penal Code to define and punish domestic violence.188 Some Cuban experts advocate specific domestic violence legislation as well as the establishment of a
Family Court with the expertise to handle such matters.189
In fact, the National Assembly has added various provisions to the
Penal Code that do address violence against women.190 In 1997, lawmakers amended the Code to increase punishment for trafficking in persons.191 Two years later, in response to the debates about the lack of a
specific domestic violence law, the National Assembly added violence
between intimates as an aggravating factor to relevant code sections.192
Criminologists have recommended additional legislation to address the
186. CEDAW Report, supra note 126, at 41.
187. Press Release: Cuba Striving Hard, supra note 123 (noting that Cuba created a
national action plan as follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women; the plan
has the status of a decision of the Council of State).
188. Interviews with law professor of the University of Havana in Havana, Cuba (Dec.
23, 2002); see also Dixie Edith, Cuba: Violencia Doméstica en la Encrucijada de la Ley
[Cuba: Domestic Violence at the Crossroads of the Law], Dec. 10, 2006, Nuevo Diario,
http://www.nuevodiariodesalta.com.ar/diario/suplenotas.asp?825.
189. See Dixie Edith, Cuba: Se Necesita Una Legislación Específica [Cuba: Specific
Legislation is Needed], MUJERESHOY, Mar. 19, 2007, http://www.mujereshoy.com/
secc_n/3649.shtml (noting one study where a majority of those interviewed thought that
there should be a specific provision in the Penal Code related to domestic violence); Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, ¶ 25.
190. In the past fifteen years, judges and police have received domestic violence training. See Raquel Sierra, Cuba: Evitar El Peor Rostro De La Violencia [Cuba: Avoiding
the Worst Face of Violence], SEMLAC, Apr. 24, 2006, http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/
2006/060424.htm (describing a forensic medical project to assist domestic violence victims in the event of prosecution). Lawyers from la Oficina Fiscalia have scheduled presentations in community settings about the criminal legal aspect of domestic violence.
Interview with attorney, Office of the Fiscalia, supra note 178.
191. CEDAW Report, supra note 126, at 49 (referencing Decree-Law No. 175, July
17, 1997).
192. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 87 (commenting on Law 87,
adopted in February 1999, amending the Cuban Criminal Code).
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need for self-defense-related laws for female defendants who commit
crimes against their attackers.193
Moreover, although Cubans reject the paradigm of criminal legal responses, such abusive actions are not without criminal penalties in some
circumstances.194 However, in instances where a perpetrator is charged,
prosecutors tend to view the criminal justice system as part of the
“broader solidarity project,” wherein complainants are presumptively
afforded credibility and respect and perpetrators are often viewed as in
need of therapy and services.195 Prosecutors generally attempt to avoid
imposing prison sentences in secure facilities, preferring instead to use
reintegrative models. These models include what Cubans refer to as work
camps or open prisons without cells, where defendants take classes and
meet in groups, and may be required to report progress to the judge.196
They often recommend that perpetrators be diverted to workplace groups
to discuss gender violence or to the programs offered by the Casas de
Orientación.197
Certainly, some perpetrators are imprisoned.198 Convictions for rape
and for physical assault carry sentences commensurate to the injury.199
However, prosecutors trained in matters relating to family violence indicate that there have been relatively few domestic violence prosecutions
and fewer that result in imprisonment due to the preference for, and perceived success of, alternative measures.200
There is a particular idiom in Cuban criminology, one that invokes
human dignity and reconcilability as premises of an approach to domestic violence.201 The Cuban socialist system of justice differentiates itself
from the world at large by focusing on prevention.202 Domestic violence
is treated as a problem reflecting cumulative social circumstances, not
193. Characterization of Women Assaulters, supra note 64, at 255–56 (noting legal
issues relating to women’s self-defense).
194. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 27, 37; Interview with attorney
from Cienfuegos, Havana in Havana, Cuba (Oct. 11, 2005).
195. Interview with Provincial Level Jurist, supra note 179; Interview with nurse,
social worker, and physician, supra note 172.
196. The descriptions offered resembled a liberal version of work release. Interview
with attorney, Office of the Fiscalia, supra note 178. Interviewees also noted that the
judges see their role as expressing support rather than threatening punishment. Id.
197. Id.
198. Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 70, at 37. This is especially true for rape.
Id.
199. Interview with attorney, Office of the Fiscalia, supra note 178.
200. Id.
201. Interview with Caridad Navarrete Calderón in Havana, Cuba (Oct. 16, 2003).
202. Id.
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solely as an act of the individual who commits it.203 The prevailing perception that domestic violence is caused by socioeconomic deprivation
and culturally determined gender roles necessarily entails the view that
individual punishment is unduly facile and often misplaced. Criminal
sanctions remain subordinated to dominant approaches that rely on organizational networks whose members are well-situated to intervene in
domestic violence matters.204
This approach is not only consistent with Cuban political culture; it also appears to be successful. Available data, including a Bureau of Justice
report, demonstrate that rates of domestic violence are lower in Cuba
than in the United States or other parts of Latin America.205
B. Juvenile Delinquency
1. Youth in Cuba: “If The Youth Fail, We All Fail”206
The subject of juvenile delinquency must be considered in the context
of the celebrated status accorded to youth in Cuba. Their importance has
been recognized by scholars from within and without (and both on and

203. See generally Dixie Edith, Cuba: Agresión Sin Golpes [Cuba: Aggression without
Blows], SEMLAC, Nov. 19, 2007, available at http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/2007/
071119.htm. One forensic medical specialist rejects considering violence not from the
perspective of “quién es malo y quién bueno” (who is good and who is bad) because of
the likelihood that the perpetrator was himself abused at an earlier point. Id.
204. Interview with Caridad Navarrete Calderón, in Havana, Cuba (Nov. 15, 2007);
Proveyer Cervantes, supra note 168; Proveyer Cervantes, supra note 169; supra text
accompanying notes 168–69.
205. In a study by the FMC, of the 25,239 individuals who sought help from one of the
185 offices throughout the country, only 1.9 percent of the cases related to intra-family
violence, including abuse by parents toward children. CEDAW Report, supra note 126, at
164–65; see also RAY MICHALOWSKI, WORLD FACTBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS:
CUBA (1993) (noting that based on data for 1988, rape and domestic violence were less
common in Cuba than in the United States and Latin America); Gastón A. Alzate, Cuba,
in TEEN LIFE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 99, 111 (Cynthia Margarita Tompkins & Kristen Sternberg eds., 2004) (noting that rape “is almost unheard of in Cuba”)
Cuba Solidarity Campaign, Women in Cuba, http://www.cuba-solidarity.org.uk/faq.asp
(last visited Feb. 17, 2010) (noting low rates of physical violence against women); Anecdotal evidence also supports this view. Eileen Schnitger & Christina Romero, Not Feminist, But Not Bad: Cuba’s Surprisingly Pro-Woman Health System, WOMEN’S HEALTH
ACTIVIST (National Women’s Health Network, Chico, CA), July/Aug. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.nwhn.org/newsletter/article1.cfm?newsletterarticles_id=325 (describing the experience of two American correspondents whose interview subjects said that
sexual violence in Cuba is rare).
206. CUBANS REFLECT ON RECENT CHANGES (NEW YORK TIMES, July 19, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com (describing a slogan on a billboard in Havana).
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off) the island.207 Young Cubans were active in the overthrow of Batista
and have since continued to participate in mass organizations and political institutions.208 As one writer observed, the Cuban revolution was
“made largely by and for the young people of the island.”209
Youth have benefitted from the revolution. Regional and international
health and human rights institutions that measure the wellbeing of children have praised Cuba for the accomplishments of its health care system.210 Cuban health measures for children are not only better on average
than those of all members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (“OECD”) and world averages generally, but they also
surpass those of the high human development countries and are equal to
or better than those of high-income OECD nations.211
Education is the highest priority in Cuba.212 Cuban leaders consider
education to be the foundational public good and the basis for achieving
social justice and cultural development.213 The proportion of the national
budget allocated for education is 13.5 percent, a significantly high figure,
particularly for a small country.214 International observers have praised
Cuban education programs at all levels, particularly the emphasis on ear207. FAGEN, supra note 30, at 145.
208. Id. Organizations such as the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC), the youth
communist organization with its own press, Juventud Rebelde, reflect ongoing efforts to
incorporate young people into Cuba’s political culture. Hernández & Dilla, supra note
26, at 45; see also María Isabel Domínguez, Cuban Youth: Aspirations, Social Perceptions, and Identity, in A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION
292, 294–95 (Philip Brenner et al. eds., 2008). Youth participate in official governmental
structures such as Poder Popular and the National Assembly, both of which include
standing youth committees. Valdés, supra note 25, at 27, 38.
209. FAGEN, supra note 30, at 145.
210. POPULATION, HEALTH AND NUTRITION INFORMATION PROJECT, THE STATUS OF
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN THE AMERICAS: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE fig. 13, 15, 19,
29 (2000) (noting that among countries in the Americas, Cuba ranked in the highest percentile in regard to the health, nutrition, environment, and education goals established at
regional summits). The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has reported high
grades for Cuba with regard to health and welfare measures for children. See Michele
Frank, Well Babies: Cuba’s National Program, MEDICC REV.: HEALTH & MED. NEWS OF
CUBA, June 2005, at 2, 4, available at http://www.medicc.org/publications/medicc_
review/0605/spotlight.html.
211. Hernández-Truyol, supra note 65, at 673–74.
212. Jorge Núñez et al., Universal Higher Education and Sustainable Social Development: The Cuban Model, 1 INT’L J. CUBAN STUD. 102, 106 (2008), available at http://www.
cubastudiesjournal.org/londonmet/library/w46406_3.pdf.
213. Id.
214. See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Summary Record of the 374th meeting:
Cuba, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.374 (May 27, 1997), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/30f394d8dcd368e4802564c0003db7b2?Opendocument.
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ly childhood development.215 The benefits of education have been widespread and, notwithstanding instances of persisting racial discrimination,
schooling has been a significant factor in diminishing racial inequality.216
Researchers describe Cuban youth as generally possessing a strong sense
of national identity and a self-image that comports with political and cultural values.217
2. Cuban Approaches to Juvenile Delinquency
Cuba has maintained steady observation of youth development and delinquent behavior.218 Preoccupation with juvenile delinquency has increased since the economic crisis of the 1990s, when the number of
children on the streets rose.219 The Cuban leadership, concerned with
deteriorating conditions and the threat of increasing economic disparities,
turned its attention to strengthening social and political bonds between
youth and the state and incorporating youth as “stake-holders” in the revolutionary project.220 As conditions in Cuba have changed, so too have
strategies for dealing with the youth populations considered most vulnerable.221 What has not changed, however, is Cuban refusal to link strategies for combating delinquency with criminal and correctional justice
strategies.222

215. Lavinia Gasperini, The Cuban Education System: Lessons and Dilemmas, COUNTRY
STUDIES: EDUCATION REFORM AND MANAGEMENT PUBLICATION SERIES, July 2000, at 5–6,
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200109907
9877269/5476641099080026826/The_Cuban_education_system_lessonsEN00.pdf (World
Bank report on the achievements of Cuba’s educational system, showing Cuban thirdgraders’ language achievement scores to be significantly higher than those of third-graders
from other Latin and Caribbean countries).
216. Alejandro de la Fuente, Recreating Racism, Race and Discrimination in Cuba’s
Special Period, in A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION 316,
317 (Philip Brenner et al. eds., 2008).
217. Domínguez, supra note 208, at 296–97.
218. Luis P. Salas, Juvenile Delinquency in Postrevolutionary Cuba: Characteristics
and Cuban Explanations, 9 CUBAN STUDIES/ESTUDIOS CUBANOS 43, 44 (1979).
219. See Serge F. Kovaleski, Increase in Crime Mars Cuba’s Reputation for Safe
Streets, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1998, at A27.
220. Cuba’s economy has shifted due to the dollarization of the economy, some privatization, and the impact of remittances. See Uriarte, supra note 74, at 110, 115–20.
221. Id. at 123.
222. Juan Mendoza Díaz, Cuba’s Experience in the Attention of Minors with Conduct
Disorder, J. CUBAN AM. ALLIANCE, Feb. 2002, at 10, available at http://www.
redandgreen.org/Cuba/Social_Work/sw07-mendoza.htm.
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a. “Preventive Work, Not Repression”223
Preventive strategies have been the principal method of addressing the
problem of juvenile delinquency, even as delinquency increased during
the Special Period.224 The Ministry of Social Welfare coordinates prevention efforts, working with national and regional assemblies, ministries,
and mass organizations to assist in delinquency prevention efforts.225
Government leaders use the state-run media to exhort citizens to help
youths who exhibit troubling behavior, urging that such youths not be
rejected.226
Research has been an integral facet of Cuban prevention strategies.227
As early as 1960, Cuba established the Center for the Evaluation, Analysis and Guidance of Minors to study problems of juvenile crime.228 In
1986, CPAS and the National Committee on Social Prevention and Child
Care appointed experts to conduct research and make recommendations
with regard to delinquency prevention.229 Similarly, the Ministries of the
Interior and Education have established research centers to collaborate
on approaches to juvenile crime.230
Educators also play an important role in delinquency prevention,
putting to use the values of Cuban participatory culture. Indeed, educators train volunteers to work with children in school and during afterschool activities.231 They emphasize humane education, affection, and
nurturing.232 Sex education, principles of nonviolence, and public health
223. Lutjens, supra note 58, at 62 (quoting Coronel Cecilia Andres, Head of the Commission for Attention to Minors).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 55, 58.
226. Id. at 62.
227. Interview with Calderón, supra note 201 (describing research as “humane and
utopian” in purpose); see also Laura Sánchez Valdés et al., Applied Ethics in Mental
Health in Cuba: Part I—Guiding Concepts and Values, 12 ETHICS & BEHAV. 223, 234
(2002) (noting humanism as an ethical value among professionals in the realm of psychology).
228. Gómez Treto, supra note 61, at 121; Mendoza Díaz, supra note 222.
229. Gómez Treto, supra note 61, at 121. The National Committee on Social Prevention and Child Care was created under the Permanent Parliamentary Commission on
Youth and Child Care and Women’s Rights. See Sonia Beretervide Dopico, Republic of
Cuba: Second Congress on Sexual Exploitation of Children, http://www.iin.oea.org/
cuba_ing.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
230. Lutjens, supra note 58, at 58.
231. Kirk, supra note 84, at 305; Gasperini, supra note 215, at 13 (noting mechanisms
that foster community participation in schools).
232. Sara Más, Violencia: Desterrar el Castigo [Violence: Exiling Punishment],
SEMLAC, Apr. 13, 2006 (noting that experts oppose such methods and argue that such
tactics fail to produce intellectual development).
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issues (such as drug abuse) are part of the curriculum.233 Teachers stress
students’ individual and collective responsibilities and cultivate a culture
of cooperation and solidarity within their classrooms as a means to discourage criminal behavior.234 Punishment and threatening techniques are
eschewed as ineffective and viewed as means by which violence is replicated.235
The institutions and organizations described in Part II of this Article
play the central role in delinquency prevention strategies.236 The CDRs
recruit retirees to provide supervision and guidance for children exhibiting troubling behavior.237 Neighbors work with school personnel to identify truancy as well as its potential causes.238 Local prevention commissions meet with citizens to address concerns about antisocial youth and
to strategize about additional supervisory measures, including the development of recreational and sports programs.239 CDR members seek solutions to the more common problems that affect children’s success in
school, including economic strain within families.240 The Unión de
Jóvenes Comunistas (“UJC”) has engaged in a media campaign to link
family violence to social violence, crime, and delinquency.241
The Talleres have also addressed youth delinquency in community development improvement projects. In an effort to incorporate youths into
mainstream activities, workshops in the Havana neighborhood of Atares,
233. CEDAW Report, supra note 126, at 128–29 (noting the incorporation of youth
organizations into the National Sex Education Centre (Cenesex)); Gasperini, supra note
215, at 20.
234. Gwendolyn Coe & Judith Lynne McConnell, The Children of Cuba, YOUNG
CHILDREN, Sept. 2004, available at http://journal.naeyc.org/btj/200409/coe.pdf (noting
that arts and literature programs are a means to impart moral, social, and political values
and are a regular part of day-to-day experiences for children); Gasperini, supra note 215,
at 19; Lissette Pérez Hernández, Social Policy Appraisal: An Urgent Matter, Specially for
Children, J. CUBAN AM. ALLIANCE, Feb. 2002, at 15, available at http://www.red
andgreen.org/Cuba/Social_Work/sw08-lissette.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
235. See supra note 232.
236. Kirk, supra note 84, at 305 (“the onus upon rearing children, of supporting their
growth, of developing an awareness of identity, was to fall upon the community as a
whole”); Lutjens, supra note 58, at 58 (noting the various ministries and organizations
that collaborate in prevention activities); Uriarte, supra note 107, at 100.
237. Kruger, supra note 92, at 108; Interview with Calderón, supra note 64.
238. Kruger, supra note 92, at 108.
239. PETER ROMAN, PEOPLE’S POWER: CUBA’S EXPERIENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 200 (1999).
240. Kruger, supra note 92, at 109 (noting that insufficient family income can make
children reluctant to go to school).
241. Dixie Edith, Palabras Que Duelen [Words that Hurt], CUBA PROFUNDA, June 26,
2008, http://cubaprofunda.org/artmeditar.php?ID=113 (describing the series in UJC’s
newspaper).
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for example, offer disaffected youths the opportunity to participate in
building restoration projects while engaging them in decision-making
processes about larger community problems.242 The Casa del Niño y la
Niña, a group started by a community development workshop that is
supported by various ministries and institutes, provides services for
children and families to improve the quality of life of children and adolescents as part of prevention efforts.243 Other organizations, such as the
Martin Luther King Center and the East Havana Cultural Centers, have
developed a number of youth programs. These programs include sporting
events, dance troupes that incorporate hip-hop, and other recreational
activities, all as a way to create constructive opportunities for youths to
participate and engage in change-making activities.244
Health care providers are principal players in delinquency prevention
efforts. They are integrated into the lives of families, and they regularly
conduct evaluations of families’ social situations for evidence of economic or psychic strain that might impact the wellbeing of children.245
When signs of behavioral or substance abuse problems are noted, followup services to ameliorate conditions are generally provided in the realm
of public health.246
These preventative approaches are based on the theory that delinquent
behavior is learned and can be unlearned without stigmatizing delinquent
youth.247 They reflect models propounded by prominent delinquency
theorists who argue that a community’s ability to supervise youths
through informal and supportive networks is key to controlling delin-

242. Marie Kennedy et al., Looking at Participatory Planning in Cuba . . . through an
Art Deco Window, 156 PROGRESSIVE PLANNING 5–6 (2003), available at http://www.
plannersnetwork.org/publications/2003_summer/kennedy_lorna_tilly.htm; Interview with
the University of Havana Department of Sociology, supra note 79.
243. Volunteer ESL Educators Helping Cuban Youth Learn English, http://www.
cubavolunteer.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
244. Kennedy et al., supra note 242, at 6; Uriarte, supra note 74, at 123 (describing
Cuban initiatives post-Special Period to develop cultural programs for youth as part of
delinquency prevention).
245. Interview with physician in Habana Vieja, Cuba (Oct. 10, 2005); Stephanie
Hauge, Primary Care in Cuba, 23 EINSTEIN J. BIOL. MED. 37, 40–41 (2007) (describing
the daily terraros or home visits by health care professionals).
246. Hauge, supra note 245, at 41; see also Examples of Social Work Programs, J.
CUBAN AM. ALLIANCE, Feb. 2002, available at http://www.redandgreen.org/Cuba/Social_
work/sw06-examples.htm (describing the program at the Community Health Center in
the town of Regla, outside of Havana).
247. Salas, supra note 218, at 54 (describing the Cuban approach as socialpsychological).
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quency.248 Cubans have supported these differential initiatives, which
target young people for support and services in a manner consistent with
Cuba’s norms and values.249
b. Socialization and Social Work: Cuba’s Social Work Brigades
Miren Uriarte has studied Cuba’s response to the economic crisis of
the 1990s and has observed that social work strategies are the newest
initiatives by which the government has attempted to transform itself to
remain effective and efficient.250 Nowhere is this more apparent than Cuba’s establishment of the Social Work Student Brigades, a key objective
of which is to confront the problems associated with juvenile delinquency.251
Beginning in 2001, Cuba established new centers affiliated with universities across the island for three related purposes: (1) to train young
people as social workers for the purpose of re-incorporating them into
educational settings; (2) to provide apprenticeship opportunities with
assurances of employment upon completion of a brigade program; and
(3) to augment resources to address social and economic problems, particularly those that contribute to delinquency.252 These centers have recruited over 100,000 unemployed youths who had not finished their education.253 Youths who receive social work training—young men and
women who were themselves in need of services and may be exhibiting
criminal behavior—receive stipends while they engage in work-study
programs.254 They are eligible to attend university upon beginning their
social work and are guaranteed paid work upon completing their pro-

248. Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774, 777–78 (1989) (describing such
intervention constructs as set forth by Clifford Shaw and Henry D. McKay).
249. Uriarte, supra note 74, at 123.
250. Id. at 105; see also David Strug & Walter Teague, New Directions in Cuban Social Work Education: What Can We Learn?, 4 SOC. WORK TODAY 2 (2002), available at
http://www.redandgreen.org/Cuba/Cuban_Social_Work_Education.htm.
251. Uriarte, supra note 74, at 122–23. Cuba has also emphasized university-level
programs in social work in addition to the Brigade training for youth who may not be
enrolled in university programs or who are otherwise unemployed. See Strug & Teague,
supra note 250, at 2.
252. Kapcia, supra note 87, at 400–01 (observing that the Brigades targeted the problem of the neglect of young Cubans to reduce discontent and a rise in juvenile delinquency); Pérez Hernández, supra note 234; Uriarte, supra note 74, at 122–23.
253. Dixie Edith, Cuba: Jóvenes Trabajan Estudiando [Young People Work Studying],
SEMLAC, Oct. 2007, http://www.redsemlac.net/noticias/2007/071015.htm.
254. Id.; Strug & Teague, supra note 250.
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grams and returning to their communities.255 Between 2002 and 2007,
380,000 new jobs for youths were created in education, health care, social work, computer technology, and other fields.256
Brigade students work with vulnerable populations, including other
youths, the elderly, families of the incarcerated, and individuals with
criminal histories.257 Social work volunteers affiliated with the brigades
identify minors engaged in antisocial acts and endeavor to manage their
behavior through various social work strategies, including tutoring,
placement in trade schools, and increased guidance and mentoring.258
They work on a one-to-one basis to distribute services and otherwise
create supportive environments as a means to intervene in criminal activity.259 Indeed, the central focus of the brigades is delinquency prevention
through nurturing instead of punishment.260
As one Cuban social worker noted, Cubans support the social work
brigades as a desirable alternative to “repressive and coercive patterns in
social control,” and they reject strategies based on the theory “that all
social maladaptation merits punishment, or that public security necessitates the separation of the socially maladapted from the social environment.”261 Social work brigades are perhaps the clearest example of a socio-educational model that provides a range of services—education,
health, and cultural development services, among others—and encourages integration of troubled youth into Cuban society.262 Through the
processes of social interaction around community problems, the social
work brigades seek to inhibit problem behavior, incorporate youths into
day-to-day life, and inculcate them with norms consistent with Cuban
political culture.
c. Legal Responses
As noted above, Cuban policy makers have long been concerned with
juvenile crime because of Cuba’s history of illiteracy, child mendicancy,

255. Strug & Teague, supra note 250.
256. Edith, supra note 253.
257. Uriarte, supra note 74, at 123–24; see also Uriarte, supra note 107, at 100 (noting
the role that neighborhood organizations play in preventing crime and delinquency).
258. Mendoza Díaz, supra note 222.
259. David Strug & Walter Teague, Cuba’s Social Work Education Initiative, in CUBA
TODAY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE SINCE THE ‘PERIODO ESPECIAL’ 271, 273 (Mauricio A.
Font ed., 2004); Uriarte, supra note 74, at 123.
260. Uriarte, supra note 74, at 123.
261. Vázquez Penelas, supra note 185, at 112.
262. Id.
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exploitation of child labor, and delinquency.263 Immediately upon assuming power, the Cuban government reformed the juvenile delinquency
system. In 1959, the National Assembly passed laws for the purpose of
reeducating and rehabilitating youths classified as delinquents.264 Trained
personnel were assigned to evaluate the social history and circumstances
of youths facing criminal charges.265 Subsequently, juvenile delinquency
matters were assigned to an integrated system of care staffed by experts
and linked to university research centers.266
Legal reforms have emphasized the protection of children over criminal sanctions that punish youth crime, and have mandated prevention
efforts as the principal means to address juvenile delinquency.267 In 1978,
the National Assembly enacted the Children and Youth Code268 to protect the rights of children to education, health (including physical education), and other social services.269 In 1990, the Cuban government signed
the Convention on the Rights of the Child270 and has since sought to implement it through media campaigns, curricular instruction, public sector
planning, and mass dissemination of information regarding treaty obligations.271
Cuba amended its Constitution in 1992 to codify the obligations of
parents to “assist the defense of . . . [the] legitimate interests” of their
263. Mendoza Díaz, supra note 222.
264. Lutjens, supra note 58, at 58.
265. Mendoza Díaz, supra note 222.
266. Id. (noting changes that took place from the 1960s through the 1980s).
267. Gómez Treto, supra note 61, at 121 (noting that CPAS, the main purpose of
which is delinquency prevention, was established through legislation as part of a depenalization process).
268. Ley No. 16 Código de la Niñez y La Juventud [Code on Children and Youth]
(1978) (Cuba), available at http://www.parlamentocubano.cu/.
269. See ROSEMARIE SKAINE, THE CUBAN FAMILY: CUSTOM AND CHANGE IN AN ERA OF
HARDSHIP 13 (2004); Pérez Hernández, supra note 234.
270. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for Signature Nov. 20, 1989, 14
U.N.T.S. 3.
271. Id. Discussions with youth revealed that students were well versed in their rights
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child; billboards in Havana proclaimed the
rights of children under its provisions. Interview with high school students in Havana,
Cuba (Nov. 15, 2007). Implementation plans for the Convention on the Rights of the
Child are published in the daily newspaper, Granma. Interview with Dr. Caridad Navarrete Calderón, supra note 64. Cuba also ratified the ILO Convention on the Abolition of
Child Labor in 1975. International Labour Organization, Database of International Labor
Standards, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/docs/declAM.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2010). Cuba has endorsed the Minimum Rules of the United Nations for the Administration of Justice to Minors (Rules of Beijing), as well as the Directives of the United Nations for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riad Directives). Mendoza Díaz, supra
note 222.
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children and to provide for the needs of youths in order to assure their
proper development and wellbeing.272 More recently, Cuba amended its
Criminal Code273 to protect children from sexual trafficking, pornography, and corruption of minors.274
The state does, when appropriate, bring criminal charges against
youths who commit crimes considered antisocial and dangerous.275 The
minimum age for criminal responsibility in Cuba is sixteen—same as the
voting age.276 Youths under sixteen may not make confessions without a
parent or legal guardian present.277 Unlike criminal courts in the United
States, there is no juvenile division in the Cuban criminal system; however, the Cuban criminal process is different for youths than for adults.278
For example, when charges are filed, a legal investigative team meets
with an interdisciplinary group to examine the youth’s circumstances and
to determine how best to intervene in family dynamics.279 Juveniles convicted between the ages sixteen and eighteen may not be imprisoned, but
they may be confined to a boarding school or treatment facility.280
Cuban legal scholars have acknowledged that there are still problems
with respect to the administration of juvenile justice. Although there has
been progress toward eliminating racial disparities in other realms, studies commissioned by the Attorney General’s office acknowledge the
272. Sheryl L. Lutjens, Restructuring Childhood in Cuba: The State as Family, in
CHILDREN ON THE STREETS OF THE AMERICAS: HOMELESSNESS, EDUCATION AND
GLOBALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, BRAZIL AND CUBA 149 (Roslyn Arlin Mickelson
ed., 2000).
273. Ley No. 21 Codigo Penal [Penal Code] (1978), available at http://www.parlament
ocubano.cu/; Ley No. 87 Modificativa del Codigo Penal [Modifying the Penal Code]
(1999), available at http://www.parlamentocubano.cu/.
274. Lutjens, supra note 58, at 63 (noting the 1997 enactment).
275. Mendoza Díaz, supra note 222. Parents can also be taken to court for failure to
fulfill their legal obligations to their children; however, this strategy is also “informed by
the preventive strategy.” Lutjens, supra note 58, at 63.
276. F.J. Raucii, An Overview to Cuban Criminal Law and Procedure, INT’L LEGAL J.
5 (Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.gsjw.com/catalogs/catalog110/section174/file
53.pdf; MICHALOWSKI, supra note 205.
277. MICHALOWSKI, supra note 205 (noting due process protections including the right
not to incriminate oneself and the prohibition against conviction based on uncorroborated
confessions).
278. Interview with Dr. Caridad Navarrete Calderón, supra note 64; Interview with the
University of Havana Department of Sociology, supra note 79.
279. Interview with an attorney from Cuba’s Oficina de la Fiscalia in Havana, Cuba
(Oct. 11, 2005). The attorney stated her preference for “cultural and educational approaches” over formal legal charges. Id.
280. Raucii, supra note 276, at 5; see also Mendoza Díaz, supra note 222 (noting that
sanctions are more lenient when applied to juveniles and the “assistance centers” that
might serve as placements for juvenile delinquents).
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overrepresentation of black and mulatto youths in the criminal justice
system.281 Some have advocated additional reforms to improve the administration of juvenile justice. For example, Dr. Ramón de la Cruz
Ochoa, formerly Attorney General of Cuba and President of the Judiciary
Commission of the National Assembly, has recommended further decriminalization of offenses.282 Other scholars have advocated increasing the
minimum age for criminal responsibility to eighteen.283
Cuban legal approaches to juvenile delinquency are perhaps best
summed up by the Vice-Dean of the University of Havana’s law faculty.
He has characterized the development of juvenile delinquency law reforms as an effort to strengthen the legal status of youths and to impose
greater responsibility for their wellbeing, while limiting criminal justice
intervention to “the bare minimum.”284 He has stressed that “the most
significant characteristic of the Cuban model lies in the fact that responsibility for treatment, evaluation[,] and effectuation is outside the domain
of social institutions linked to correctional centers.” He has also said:
A system for the care of minors with transgressive behavior depends
upon a political will aimed at the elimination of causes and conditions
that create a favorable milieu for delinquency within sectors of society.
Nothing is solved by adopting new laws while maintaining unscathed
the bases of inequality. For today’s Cuba, a main concern is the guarantee of a system that gives priority attention to youth and children while
working towards the elimination of social conditions that facilitate the
emergence of damaging behavior.285

Notwithstanding the need for improvement, crime (particularly juvenile crime) is again on the decline in Cuba.286
IV. POLITICAL CULTURE AND ORDINARY CRIME: SOME COMPARISONS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA
The contrasts in the approaches to crime between Cuba and the United
States are stark. For purposes of comparison, this Part describes some of
the fundamental characteristics of the U.S. approach to crime (specifically, juvenile delinquency and domestic violence) and examines the weakening of U.S. social structures that relate to the formation of social capi281. De la Fuente, supra note 216, at 318–19 (noting that the data, while scant and
impressionistic, nonetheless raises these concerns).
282. Raucii, supra note 276, at 4 (urging shifts from a “repressive vision about
crime”).
283. Interview with the University of Havana Department of Sociology, supra note 79.
284. Mendoza Díaz, supra note 222.
285. Id.
286. Raucii, supra note 276, at 4 (noting an absence of gang-related crime).
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tal and the impact of the demise of these structures on community crime
control initiatives.
Contrasts between the United States and Cuba, however, do not tell the
whole story. Progressive U.S. criminologists share many of the views of
their Cuban counterparts; they agree that the sources of crime are found
principally in political and economic structural relations.287 A number of
these theorists propound the view that community networks can function
to harness norms and activate informal social controls in lieu of formal
sanctions.288
These theories gave rise in the 1980s to community-based programs—
often identified as Alternatives to Incarceration (“ATIs”). Many of these
programs operate from the premise that there is a social context to individual behavior, and their facilitators therefore endeavor to develop relationships with families and foster community support systems.289 Although ATIs share some characteristics with the Cuban approach, they
have not yet delivered on their promises. This Part concludes with a review of the similarities between the two systems in order demonstrate
how historical traditions and political culture both shape the success or
failure of progressive crime prevention and control strategies.290
A. Paradigms of Modern U.S. Criminology
1. Fear and Loathing: The Carceral State
U.S. approaches to ordinary crime, including domestic violence and
juvenile delinquency, must be considered in light of the overall frame-

287. Michael Tigar notes that as between Cuba and the United States, there is much
more in common than people think with regard to basic legal concepts, particularly in
criminal law. Michael E. Tigar, “Revolution in the Balance: Law and Society in Contemporary Cuba” by Debra Evenson, CUBA update 33 (Feb. 1995) (book review).
288. Reenah L. Kim, Note, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The
Need for Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory
Councils, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 462 (2001); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 395 (2000). These theories have ebbed
and flowed; it was the civil rights movement of the 1960s that renewed debates about
crime as a function of blameworthy individuals or morbid social conditions. Jane
Schneider & Peter Schneider, The Anthropology of Crime and Criminalization, 37 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 351, 353 (2008).
289. Weissman, supra note 9, at 235 (noting that during the past 30 years, most jurisdictions in the United States have incorporated ATIs as part of the criminal justice system).
290. Tim Hope, Community Crime Prevention, 19 CRIME & JUST. 21, 22 (1995) (noting
the effect that macro-level economics may have on efforts to rely on crime prevention
strategies based on the strengths of the social capital within local communities).
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work of U.S. criminology. The United States can best be described as a
“prescriptive state”—one that relies primarily on state penal sanctions to
enforce norms of behavior.291 The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world.292 There are 2.3 million people currently in prisons and jails in the United States, a 500% increase since thirty years
prior.293 Federal statutes have increased the numbers of crimes subject to
the death penalty.294 New mandatory sentencing laws in all fifty states
have resulted in the incarceration of people who previously would have
received noncustodial sentences of probation.295 Some states have revived the chain gangs of the Reconstruction era.296 Crime discourse is
punctuated by analogies to war, with the criminal depicted as an enemy
to be isolated and defeated.297 Fear of crime has resulted in increased
surveillance; people once characterized as disorderly are now viewed as
potential criminals to be aggressively controlled, if not removed, from
mainstream life.298

291. Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, Good Society, and the Prescriptive State, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 355, 359, 363 (2000) (describing the ways in which a “good society”
operates to enforce its norms, in comparison to the “prescriptive state” that functions
through coercion, using formal criminal laws as the mainstay of control).
292. See Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 2008, at A1
293. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES
AT MIDYEAR 2008, AT TBL. 17 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?
ty=pbdetail&iid=839; Charles C. Boettcher, Comment, Testing the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–98 (1994), 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1057 (1998)
(noting “a revolution for federal capital punishment”).
294. In 1988 Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which added death as a possible penalty for so-called “drug kingpins.” Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4387
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), (B) (2000)). Congress also passed the
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, which authorized capital punishment for more than
fifty preexisting federal crimes for which the death penalty previously had not attached.
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959–70 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of Title 18 of the U.S. Code).
295. See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS & NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS &
PROVERTY, A DREAM DENIED: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES
(2006), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/report.pdf;
Ramdall Amster, Patterns of Exclusion: Sanitizing Space, Criminalizing Homelessness,
30 SOC. JUST. 195, 199–204 (2003); Elaine Wolf & Marsha Weissman, Revising Federal
Sentencing Policy: Some Consequences of Expanding Eligibility for Alternative Sanctions, 42 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 192, 192–94 (1996).
296. Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 1, 5–6 (1997).
297. See id. at 42.
298. Harcourt, supra note 80, at 298, 303–04.
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This has been particularly true in regard to juveniles. Although early
juvenile reformers rejected the criminal justice system as a means to eradicate delinquency, policies now emphasize punishment.299 Juvenile law
scholars have demonstrated the ways that youths have been demonized in
the United States; it makes for a stark comparison with the exalted position of Cuban youths.300 Media have portrayed youths as superpredators.301 Politicians decry youthful offenders as “a more malevolent breed
of offender than their predecessors,” and claim that today’s youths require more stringent sanctions, notwithstanding data to the contrary.302
In the last twenty-five years, juvenile incarceration in the United States
has increased by 43%.303 Sentences for youths are increasingly more punitive.304 At least one state has spent more on prisons than on higher education.305 Despite guidelines limiting the use of pre-adjudication detention to ensure a juvenile’s appearance at trial or minimize the risk of reoffense prior to disposition, youths are frequently detained for purposes
299. Monya M. Bunch, Comment, Juvenile Transfer Proceedings: A Place for Restorative Justice Values, 47 HOWARD L.J. 909, 915 (2004); see also Gordon Bazemore et al.,
Boundary Changes and the Nexus between Formal and Informal Social Control: Truancy
Intervention as a Case Study in Criminal Justice Expansionism, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 521, 523 (2004).
300. Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1443, 1488–89, 1497 (2008) (describing the specter of
youth violence and moral panic about so-called dangerous criminal youth).
301. Id. at 1497; Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000); Elizabeth S. Scott,
Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 337, 351–52 (2006);
Erin H. Flynn, Comment, Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: Juvenile Deterrence and
Retribution Post-Roper v. Simmons, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2008).
302. Birckhead, supra note 300, at 1488–89; Barbara Fedders et al., The Defense Attorney’s Perspective on Youth Violence, in SECURING OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE: NEW
APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 84, 88 (Gary S. Katzmann ed.,
2002); see also Lizabeth N. De Vries, Comment, Guilt by Association: Proposition 21’s
Gang Conspiracy Law Will Increase Youth Violence in California, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 191,
197 n.26 (citing Violent Youth Predator Act of 1996: Hearings on H.R. 3565 Before the
H. Subcomm. on Crime, 104th Cong.).
303. Birckhead, supra note 300, at 1487–88; Daniel P. Mears, Exploring State-Level
Variation in Juvenile Incarceration Rates, 86 PRISON J. 470, 470 (2006) (noting a 43%
rise during the 1990s).
304. John Muncie, The ‘Punitive Turn’ in Juvenile Justice: Culture of Control and
Rights Compliance in Western Europe and the USA, 8 YOUTH JUST. 107, 108 (2008).
305. Harris, supra note 296, at 1 (describing California); Tracey L. Meares, It’s a
Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579, 580 (1997) (observing that imposing
long sentences is the most common way to treat teen and adult drug problems); John D.
“Jay” Elliot, Juvenile Justice, in THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 195, 196–97 (American
Bar Association ed., 2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjust/scj.doc
(reviewing an increase in harsh and lengthy sentences for youth).
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of punishment.306 Schools delegate their responsibilities for problem students to the criminal justice system.307 Police are now deployed to handle
behaviors once addressed by school principals.308 Metal detectors and
video cameras have transformed spaces of education into sites of high
security.309 In contrast with the Cuban approach that incorporates a spirit
of faith in community efforts, the “nothing works” mantra popularized in
the U.S. in the 1980s moved the country toward the paradigm of incapacitation.310
An emphasis on punishment has similarly shaped the strategies and informed the values of the U.S. legal system’s response to domestic violence.311 Feminist demands during the 1960s for legal parity of domestic violence with other crimes found a receptive environment in the lawand-order climate of the 1970s and 1980s.312
In fact, recent research suggests that the sources of domestic violence
are complex matters that cannot be readily resolved by the criminal justice system.313 These findings notwithstanding, policy makers continue to
resort to law enforcement and prosecutorial strategies as the principal
306. Patrick Webb & William Allan Kritsonis, Controlling Those Kids: Social Control
and the Use of Pretrial Detention among Youth in the United States of America: National
Implications, 3 DOCTORAL F. NAT’L J. PUBLISHING & MENTORING DOCTORAL STUDENT
RES. 3 (2006), available at http://www.nationalforum.com/Electronic%20Journal%20
Volumes/Webb,%20Patrick%20Controlling%20Those%20Kids.pdf. The use of detention
has also been a function of graft and corruption. Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges
Plead Guilty in Payoffs for Jailing Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A22
(describing two judges who sentenced juveniles without counsel or due process to privately owned detention centers in exchange for payment of money).
307. Bazemore, supra note 299, at 562–63 (criticizing the role of the criminal justice
system in truancy policy, despite its success, as it limits the roles of schools and families).
308. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO
THE JAILHOUSE TRACK 7 (2005), available at http://www.advancementproject.org/reports/
FINALEOLrep.pdf.
309. See generally Randall Atlas, Designing Safe Schools (2002), http://www.
eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/1a/41/7c.pdf.
310. Webb & Kritsonis, supra note 306, at 3.
311. Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between
“the Truly National and the Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1113 (2001); Jeffrey
Fagan & Angela Browne, Violence Between Spouses and Intimates: Physical Aggression
Between Women and Men in Intimate Relationships, in 3 UNDERSTANDING AND
PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 115, 243 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A.
Roth eds., 1994).
312. Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal is Political—and Economic: Rethinking
Domestic Violence, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 399 (2007).
313. Id. at 387, 399–402, 411–23 (examining the ways that structural economic dislocation, outsourcing, and plant closings have contributed to de-stabilization of households
and have produced increased rates of domestic violence).
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responses to domestic violence.314 Domestic violence strategies are primarily focused on individual transgressors and rely on idiosyncratic explanations for abusive behaviors. Crime policies based on “[s]ituation
and context-critical” theories that consider historical, social, economic,
and cultural circumstances have been largely ignored.315 In contrast with
the Cuban approach, U.S. advocates have largely dismissed as inappropriate the efficacy of family and community systems as methods of intervention.316 Policy and legislative developments have resulted in higher
rates of arrest for domestic assault as compared to non-domestic assault,
including an increased rate of arrest of women.317
These developments reflect a shift to “the carceral society,” characterized by an increase in disciplinary and monitoring strategies and the
professionalization of punishment.318 Whereas the research of Cuban
criminologists is framed as “humanistic projects,” criminology in the
United States operates largely within a technocratic criminal justice system embedded in what David Garland identifies as “the culture of control.”319 Punishment has developed as the normative response of choice,
even as it drains community resources.320 The paradigm of mass incarceration has thus served to create the largest prison population in the world,
a development that has gone largely unchallenged within the dominant
institutions that set policy and control crime responses.321 Indeed, one

314. Id. at 399.
315. Fagan & Browne, supra note 311, 239–40 (distinguishing between criminal justice theories that are valued in a jurisprudential setting).
316. See Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1999) (describing various informal social
and community vigilance mechanisms that exist out of the mainstream).
317. David Hirschel, et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: to What
Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255,
259–60 (2007); Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle
Ground” Between Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic
Violence, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427, 442 (2003).
318. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 211–16
(1977); COHEN, supra note 38, at 26.
319. Weissman, supra note 9, at 235–36.
320. One recent study found that corrections—including prisons, jails, probation and
parole services—cost $60.3 billion for supervision of about 7 million adults and juveniles. These costs reflected an increase of 535 percent from 2001. JAMES AUSTIN & TONY
FABELO, THE DIMINISHING RETURNS OF INCREASED INCARCERATION 8 (2004).
321. See Harcourt, supra note 80, at 369 (quoting Michel Foucault, who noted that the
punishment paradigm has lowered the “threshold of tolerance to penalty.”); Liptak, supra
note 292.
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study found that rates of incarceration go up whether crime is decreasing
or increasing.322
The increase in incarceration rates is due to a political culture that is
driven more by zeal for punishment than social science data.323 As Jonathan Simon has noted, “crime has become a privileged rationale and rationality for governing.”324 The specter of crime often precipitates public
outrage disproportionate to the actual danger posed by criminals.325
2. The Dissipation of Social Capital
An examination of civic participation in the United States reveals further differences between U.S. and Cuban approaches to ordinary crime.
As in Cuba, the development of social capital through civic organizations, clubs, and neighborhood associations directly bears on rates of
crime in the United States.326 Trusting relationships between neighbors,
friendship networks, and civic engagement with a wide range of groups
are all factors that act to mitigate criminal behavior.327 However, membership in these types of associations has declined since the early
1970s.328 In his groundbreaking study, Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam
322. See RYAN S. KING ET AL., INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP
1, 3 (2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_iandc_
complex.pdf. The authors found that between 1984 and 1991 crime rates increased by
17%, but incarceration rates rose even more—by 65%. Between 1991 and 1998, crime
rates fell by 22% but incarceration rates continued to rise—by 47%. Id.
323. GARLAND, supra note 44, at 13 (noting that researchers and experts have lost
influence in helping to shape criminal policies and laws).
324. Jonathan Simon, Guns, Crime, and Governance, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 133, 136 (2002).
325. Jonathan Simon, Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1415,
1416 (2002) (noting that fear of crime leads to greater demands for harsher and more
punitive responses). As an example, one study notes the development of restrictive admission policies with regard to individuals with criminal records although there is no
evidence that students with criminal records commit crimes on campus at a rate higher
than other students. Marsha Weissman et al., Closing the Doors to Higher Education:
Another Collateral Consequence of a Criminal Conviction 2–3 (Apr. 2008), available at
http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/HigherEd.pdf.
326. See Sampson & Laub, supra note 82, at 140–41; supra note 82 and accompanying
text.
327. Richard Rosenfeld et al., Social Capital and Homicide, 80 SOC. FORCES 283, 290,
300 (2001); Fagan & Meares, supra note 50, at 187 (offering examples such as PTAs and
programs for adolescents).
328. DAVID HALPERN, SOCIAL CAPITAL 210 (2005). Halpern describes social organizations that have strengthened as “[s]elf help groups, checque-book-based social movements, and religious fundamentalist groups” as well as youth volunteerism. These organizations “involve low-cost, minimal wider social contact activities.” Id. at 211. In contrast,
“the picture for cross-cutting, multi-faceted forms of social capital is almost universally
of decline.” Id.
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describes the dramatic decrease in citizen participation in community
affairs and relational networks upon which norms of reciprocity are established.329 Theda Skocpol notes the shift to memberless associations
that are professionally driven and managed.330
The correlation between civic disengagement and the deterioration of
civil society with high rates of incarceration is well-established.331 As
incarceration rates increase, social capital further dissipates. Families are
impacted by the imprisonment of (mostly) young men often at great distances from their homes. The negative effects of incarceration are often
compounded by the social, economic, and legal stigmas associated with
criminal records. These dynamics impact social cohesion and limit the
capacity of communities to create associational networks. Simply stated,
community residents confront reduced opportunities to build relationships and develop social capital.332
Moreover, neighborhood groups that are created for the purpose of reducing crime but that function within a criminal justice framework that
favors incarceration often inhibit the development of trusting relationships.333 For example, in most neighborhoods, crime watch programs
serve as hotlines to the police and enlist residents to assist in criminal
justice surveillance and arrest activities.334 In neighborhoods already disrupted by high rates of imprisonment, such organizations are more likely
to decrease the willingness of residents to intervene in crime prevention
activities. To be sure, in neighborhoods where young men, especially
blacks and Latinos, are disproportionately incarcerated and removed
from their communities, the very legitimacy of informal social controls is
undermined.335

329. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000).
330. THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT
IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 178 (2003).
331. See Etzioni, supra note 291, at 355 (describing the National Commission on Civic
Renewal’s “A Nation of Spectators: How Civic Disengagement Weakens America and
What We Can Do about It” and the Council on Civil Society’s “A Call to Civil Society:
Why Democracy Needs Moral Truths”); sources cited supra note 327.
332. Saegert & Winkel, supra note 81, at 220.
333. For a comparison with Cuban community groups that work within a framework of
social solidarity, see supra notes 96–99.
334. Harris, supra note 296, at 33–34 (noting that there is nothing empowering about
the U.S. model of community crime control); see also supra notes 66, 178–82, 240 and
accompanying text (contrasting these sorts of approaches in Cuba).
335. Todd R. Clear & Dina R. Rose, When Neighbors Go To Jail: Impact on Attitudes
About Form and Informal Social Control, NAT’L INST. JUST., July 1999, available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/fs000243.pdf (noting that effective community controls
require that community members believe and have confidence in them).
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The fact is that in the United States, state institutional mechanisms are
more likely to be emphasized than social solidarity in crime prevention
efforts. These circumstances create structural obstacles to progressive
crime reform. It is within this context that progressive alternatives such
as ATIs function.
3. ATIs: Arrested Development and Net-Widening
ATIs emerged in the 1980s in response to two factors: the alarming
growth of prison populations and the promise of the effectiveness of supervision and treatment plans for criminals.336 Proponents envisioned
ATIs as a means to break from imprisonment as the default response to
lawbreaking.337 ATI programs typically include rehabilitation-oriented
programming (notably drug treatment), new methods of accountability
(such as restorative justice approaches and community service), and new
methods of supervision (such as home confinement and electronic monitoring).338
Notwithstanding the specific goal of ATIs of avoiding the use of incarceration, they remain inexorably implicated in the dominant paradigm of
the criminal justice system and function within the legal constraints of
mandatory sentences.339 The issue is not one of effectiveness. Recidivism
rates for ATI participants are comparable or better than similarly situated
incarcerated people.340 However, most individuals referred to ATIs face
misdemeanor or low-level felonies and are not likely candidates for incarceration in the first place.341 Those who face the greatest risk of incarceration are typically considered ineligible for most ATIs.342

336. See JOAN PETERSILIA ET AL., Introduction, in SMART SENTENCING: THE
EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS, at ix–xv (James M. Byrne et al. eds., 1992);
Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST. 99 (1996).
337. FAY HONEY KNOPP ET AL., INSTEAD OF PRISONS: A HANDBOOK FOR ABOLITIONISTS
(1976).
338. For an overview of ATI programs, see Weissman, supra note 9, at 237–42.
339. Id. at 247.
340. Jukka Savolainen, The Impact of Felony ATI Programs on Recidivism, N.Y. CITY
CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, INC., Apr. 2003, http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief2.pdf.
341. See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 224 (1990); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES
RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES 41 (2005).
342. See Thomas G. Blomberg et al., Intermediate Punishment: Redistributing or Extending Social Control?, 19 CRIME, LAW, & SOC. CHANGE 187 (1993); James Bonta et al.,
Can Electronic Monitoring Make a Difference? An Evaluation of Three Canadian Programs, 46 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 61, 62–63 (2000).
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ATIs further depend on a broad range of social services to assist with
housing, education, health care, and mental health programs, without
which the very premise of their efforts is compromised. But over the past
two and half decades, public support for these types of social services
has decreased.343 Without this support system, ATIs are unable to offer
the full range of services upon which their clients depend. Drug treatment programs, for example, are in short supply, despite their promise in
reducing crime and recidivism.344 Moreover, as noted above, the United
States has suffered a decline in social capital network opportunities of
the type upon which ATIs rely to function effectively within communities.345
Despite their stated purposes, ATIs have in some instances actually
contributed to increased incarceration.346 Many individuals who are
enrolled in ATIs face heightened scrutiny and supervision for behaviors
that would otherwise not be considered law-breaking.347 ATI clients are
required to report to parole officers, refrain from contact with convicted
felons, and remain employed or actively looking for work.348 These conditions may be an appropriate exchange for avoiding imprisonment.
However, imposition of custodial sentences that would have otherwise
been ordered is not the only consequence for violating these requirements. ATI participants are likely to be sentenced to even harsher penalties, often without due process protections, as additional punishment for
failing to succeed in their programs.349
ATIs have suffered significant setbacks in efforts to transform the
dominant carceral culture. They function within a political culture that
privileges the formal criminal justice system in general and incarceration
in particular as a response to crime. In contrast with Cuban participatory
mechanisms that promote civic responsibility for the redistribution of
343. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS: U.S. PRISONS 16–17 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/
10/21/ill-equipped.
344. Beth A. Colgan, The Presidential Politics of Prisoner Reentry Reform, 20 FED.
SENT’G REP. 110, 117 n.120 and accompanying text (2007).
345. See Fagan & Meares, supra note 50, at 226.
346. Weissman, supra note 9, at 246–47; see also COHEN, supra note 38, at 44, 49.
347. COHEN, supra note 38, at 44 (referring to denser nets in addition to widened nets).
348. Weissman, supra note 9, at 246.
349. See Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Intensive Probation and Parole, 20 CRIME &
JUST. 281, 306–07 (1996). One study demonstrated that individuals in ATIs not only
spend considerable time incarcerated for their underlying crimes, but may be incarcerated
for behaviors unrelated to their criminal charges, including “violating treatment expectations, administrative convenience, missing a group meeting, sassing a teacher . . . .”
COHEN, supra note 38, at 70, 71. This is particularly true for juveniles. Id.
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public goods, ATIs have fewer moral resources to draw upon. In a larger
sense, the comparison with the Cuban approach to crime serves to underscore the need to consider political culture; otherwise—good intentions notwithstanding—it may be impossible to develop progressive
crime policies.350 In the end, ATIs may simply “redistribut[e] . . . penal
power into a wider social space.”351
CONCLUSION
The Cuban revolutionary project has entered its fiftieth year—time
sufficient to reflect on efforts to deploy values embedded in political culture as the normative determinants of social relationships. It is the very
nature of the Cuban political culture of morality and its “place-bound
source of self-identification” that offer insight into the differences in social control that set Cuba apart from the United States.352 Cubans assume
responsibility for crime “as an expression of a more responsible and participatory concept of life in a collectivity,” and as “an expression of a
cultural pattern more sensitive to the social order.”353
David Garland describes the social control mechanisms that inform
U.S. criminal justice policies as a reflection of social and economic
changes of late capitalism, such as the transformation from manufacturing to service, the increase in income inequality, and other consequences
of globalization and the attending insecurity and deterioration of public
goods.354 But Cuba, too, has undergone significant economic dislocation
in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It too has suffered widening inequalities as Soviet assistance and subsidized petroleum imports disappeared. But in Cuba’s appeal to political and cultural
metavalues, moral purpose—having become a prominent facet of survival strategies, especially during the 1990s—has served to offset material
adversity. By invoking an ethical political culture, realized through longstanding social practices of civic participation, Cubans have maintained
social structures designed to inhibit conditions that give rise to crime and
deviance while supporting the most vulnerable populations.
In contrast, in a society that “governs through crime,”355 both poverty
and crime are characterized as the results of individual choices made by
350. Harcourt, supra note 80, at 373 (describing a particular approach to criminal justice based on reconcilability, love, and mutual support).
351. COHEN, supra note 38, at 76.
352. See supra note 30.
353. Hernández & Dilla, supra note 26, at 44.
354. GARLAND, supra note 44, at 3–6.
355. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).
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unworthy deviants, and this in turn justifies policies that undermine the
efficacy of publicly supported prevention services and encourages the
use of punitive responses.356 The success of progressive crime control
strategies, such as ATIs, as meaningful alternatives to the carceral state,
requires a fundamental political and cultural shift through which social
and community relationships must be redefined and restructured. Such
efforts, however, have been neither successful nor sustained.357 Ultimately, changes in U.S. approaches to ordinary crime necessitate a broad
change in political culture.
As the opening epigraphs to this Article suggest, the contrast in political culture between the United States and Cuba is vast. In the United
States, the state freely exercises its control in the sphere of punishment
but is restrained from interfering with the distribution of material goods
and services, whereas the Cuban state readily intervenes in the former
while encouraging informal social controls in response to crime.358 For
those who agree that values such as reciprocity, community, cooperation,
and solidarity are essential to enlightened criminal justice policies, the
Cuban approach holds promising relevance.

356. Id.
357. Hope, supra note 290, at 23.
358. Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: A Brief Genealogy 2, 3 (University of
Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 472, 2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428463.

